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Abstract 
Total force integration (TFI)—the operational linking of geographically 
proximate active duty (AD) and air reserve component (ARC) units with similar 
missions—has become a prevalent method for greater utilization of ARC forces to reduce 
operating costs.  This research examines TFI implementation in Rapid Engineer 
Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE), a subset of 
Air Force civil engineering, in terms of the outcomes units receive from being in a TFI 
initiative, what factors contribute to causing those outcomes, and how those outcomes 
may be improved by manipulating the contributing factors.  Four cases of RED HORSE 
TFI were studied using case study research methods and focusing on textual analysis of 
structured interviews with twenty senior RED HORSE members.  The research identified 
prevailing outcomes, as well as whether the AD unit, ARC unit, or RED HORSE 
enterprise received each outcome, prominent factors, as well as the type of outcomes 
associated with those factors.  Manipulating internal factors such as attitudes and 
enterprise-level management engagement may result in increased benefits and reduced 
disbenefits from RED HORSE TFI initiatives and may be applicable to other areas of the 
previously unstudied field of TFI in combat support organizations.  
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AN ANALYSIS OF TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION IN RED HORSE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 I.  Introduction 
Background 
The Total Force concept refers to a view that Active Duty, Reserve, and National 
Guard forces are one team with shared objectives rather than three distinct organizations 
with objectives that differ more than they align.  This idea originated after the Vietnam 
War when budget pressures to reduce military force structure compelled military leaders 
to think about equipping and employing the reserve component (the Reserves and 
National Guard) as an operational force (Correll, 2011).  Again facing budget pressures 
throughout the last decade, military leaders have evolved the Total Force concept into 
Total Force Integration (TFI)—the operational linking of geographically proximate active 
duty (AD) and reserve component (RC) units with similar missions.  Under TFI each unit 
maintains its own chain of command, but purposeful inter-unit coordination and 
alignment of equipment, facilities, and manpower ensures operational unity of effort and 
more efficient and effective use of resources (Department of the Air Force, 2007). 
Long before TFI policy was introduced in 2006, operations integrated AD and RC 
forces toward a common mission as far back as 1961 during the Berlin crisis.  These 
legacy integrations differed in structure from the current TFI construct, but they laid the 
groundwork for increased partnership between the components that has become 
increasingly attractive to mitigate decreased operational capability from decreased 
budgets.  Although the exact magnitude of savings realized from greater employment of 
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the RC is routinely under debate, it is generally accepted that the RC is less costly than 
AD and that sharing resources can lead to more efficient use of those resources (Total 
Force Enterprise Management Division, 2012).  This research examines the application 
of TFI within the context of one specific functional community, Rapid Engineer 
Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE). 
Air Force Civil Engineering (AFCE) functions as a key enabler to projecting air, 
space, and cyberspace power by furnishing and maintaining the platforms from which 
that power is projected, from fixed installations.  Divided into two fundamental mission 
sets, Civil Engineering (CE) squadrons are designated as either Prime Base Engineer 
Emergency Force (Prime BEEF) or RED HORSE.  Prime BEEF squadrons are tied to 
specific installations and provide planning, maintenance, contract construction 
management, environmental stewardship, and emergency services to support their base’s 
operational mission.  RED HORSE squadrons, on the other hand, operate as a theater 
asset and provide highly mobile heavy construction and repair capability as well as a host 
of specialized capabilities (Department of the Air Force, 2011). 
Problem Statement 
The Department of Defense is corporately committed to integrating the active and 
reserve components to have a more capable total force that uses resources more 
efficiently and effectively (Department of Defense, 2008).  This commitment was 
manifested in the AFCE community when the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force directed that RED HORSE implement TFI to the greatest extent 
possible (Wynne and Moseley, 2007).  All four active duty RED HORSE squadrons have 
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implemented TFI with ARC RED HORSE squadrons, and three other TFI initiatives exist 
between ARC RED HORSE squadrons and AD Prime BEEF squadrons.  Inter-
component associations through TFI were established at the CSAF’s direction and will 
presumably endure for the foreseeable future, so it is in the best interest of TFI units and 
the Air Force to realize the maximum benefit those associations can offer.  Therefore, this 
research endeavored to answer the question, “what are the beneficial and non-beneficial 
outcomes of TFI initiatives between RED HORSE organizations from the perspective of 
the units themselves and the RED HORSE enterprise, and what actions can improve these 
outcomes?”  Examples of beneficial outcomes include reduced operating costs, increased 
manpower, or a more capable force.  Non-beneficial outcomes are the opposite of 
beneficial outcomes and may include increased operating cost, decreased manpower, or a 
less capable force.  The phrases beneficial outcome and non-beneficial outcome are 
considered synonymous with the terms benefit and disbenefit, respectively, and are used 
interchangeably throughout this document. 
Research Objective 
This research seeks to address the above problem by examining the outcomes of 
RED HORSE TFI initiatives and the factors that contribute to each outcome.  
Understanding the outcomes and their contributing factors will shed light on the value 
each TFI initiative provides to its constituent organizations and the RED HORSE 
enterprise, as well as the actions that may make TFI outcomes more beneficial.  The 
following questions subdivide the research question into four investigative areas. 
• How do TFI units and the RED HORSE enterprise benefit from TFI? 
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• What disbenefits to TFI units and the RED HORSE enterprise result from 
TFI? 
• How do contextual factors contribute to realizing benefits and disbenefits 
from TFI? 
• How might contextual factors be influenced to make TFI initiatives more 
beneficial to the constituent units, RED HORSE enterprise, and the Air Force? 
These four questions are the basis for the overall analysis of TFI in RED HORSE 
organizations, which should provide clarification of successful aspects of the TFI 
initiatives as well as recommendations for further improvement.  Conclusions or 
recommendations from this research may also have relevance for similar functional areas, 
such as the CE Prime BEEF mission and other Mission Support Group areas 
Methodology 
This research applies the case study methodology to investigate RED HORSE 
Total Force Integration.  Case study research methods are especially suited at 
synthesizing various types of sources to answer “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 2009).  
Specific sources incorporated in this research include structured interviews conducted 
with senior members of RED HORSE units in TFI initiatives, as well as documents and 
records from those units and the staff agencies that support RED HORSE units.  First, 
key documents outlining plans and objectives for each TFI initiative provided the 
framework for further data collection and data analysis.  Next, the structured interviews 
contributed qualitative data, and textual analysis elicited meaningful information from 
that data to answer the investigative questions.  Chapter III discusses the methodology in 
greater depth. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
In the course of a research effort it becomes necessary to make assumptions to 
ensure an appropriate and analyzable scope of research.  The general assumptions 
necessary for this research include the following: 
• The RED HORSE concept of operations (CONOPS), organizational structure, 
and doctrinal role will not significantly change. 
• Policy on how TFI is implemented will not significantly change. 
• Data—both quantitative and qualitative—do not contain any deliberate 
misrepresentations and are accurate to the best understanding of the parties 
providing them. 
The assumption regarding organizational structure is particularly important in 
light of the force structure changes that were discussed while this research was being 
conducted.  The Air Force announced that overall manning would be reduced by 25,000 
members (Air Force Public Affairs Agency, 2013), which puts pressure on each 
functional community to determine where to make their portion of those cuts.  
Discussions were in progress to significantly reduce and shift manpower in RED HORSE 
to include possibly divesting one or more squadrons (RED HORSE program office, 
2013a).  This research did not try to anticipate any specific outcome and used fiscal year 
2013 organizational structures and manning throughout the duration of the research. 
General assumptions, as well as a researcher’s choice of methodologies, impose 
certain limitations to how the research is evaluated and applied.  Expert elicitation 
methods like structured interviews have inherent biases because the data are subjective.  
Systematic procedures in conducting and analyzing the interviews were implemented to 
mitigate bias from the interview respondents and the researcher.  Availability bias is a 
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cognitive process where recent and vivid memories dominate the recollection and 
decisions people make (Gerras, 2008).  Providing interviewees with the interview guide 
containing a topics list three days before the interview added a stimulus to look beyond 
recent and vivid examples so that interviewees might discuss the whole spectrum of RED 
HORSE TFI topics.  Selection bias is where there are systematic differences between the 
portion of a population selected and the portion of the population not selected (Daniel, 
2012).  Purposive sampling used in this research deliberately exhibits selection bias, but 
using specific selection criteria ensured that expertise was the primary difference between 
selected and non-selected members of the population.  Framing bias is where the wording 
of a question suggests answers of a specific nature (Gerras, 2008), which was mitigated 
in this research by testing, adjusting, and retesting interview questions with five pilot 
study interviews.  Finally, data analysis could be bias by the manner in which coding 
interview transcripts was conducted.  The coding process was systematic and carried out 
in a consistent environment by a single person.  Validation by comparing parallel coding 
efforts by several people to measure the consistency of their coding would have 
strengthened the findings of this research. 
As with any research, conclusions herein are inherent to the functional areas 
investigated and may not apply to other functional areas without adjustment or further 
analysis.  For example, this research only includes the four TFI initiatives between two 
RED HORSE squadrons and omits the TFI initiatives between RED HORSE and Prime 
BEEF squadrons; therefore, conclusions about the former may not apply to the latter. 
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Preview 
This research endeavored to analyze existing TFIs in the RED HORSE 
community; identifying outcomes and their related factors, discussing how those 
outcomes may be improved, and providing recommendations to RED HORSE 
stakeholders.  The next chapter examines existing literature on RED HORSE, total force 
integration, and methodological topic areas.  Chapter III describes the case study research 
methodology employed to scrutinize existing RED HORSE TFI initiatives.  The results 
are then presented and discussed in Chapter IV.  Finally, the last chapter provides 
conclusions and recommendations based on the research findings. 
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II.  Literature Review 
This research combines the two subject areas of total force integration (TFI) and 
RED HORSE organizations.  This literature review is an exploration and examination of 
existing articles, documents, presentations, and reports to inform the study of RED 
HORSE TFI.  First, examining the heritage of TFI, its purported benefits and challenges, 
and applicable policy illuminates the administrative context for RED HORSE TFI.  Next, 
discussing RED HORSE doctrine, organization, and operations provides an 
organizational context in which to understand RED HORSE TFI.  The specific 
circumstances of the four RED HORSE TFI initiatives in view are profiled as well.  
Finally, candidate methodologies are discussed and the selected methodology and its 
related tools and techniques are presented in detail. 
Total Force Integration 
In terms of policy, the Total Force concept started with a 1970 memorandum from 
Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, announcing that the military services would shift 
toward a greater reliance on Reserve and National Guard forces and reduce Active Duty 
end strength in order to reduce defense expenditures (Correll, 2011).  In practice, 
however, the Air Force implemented the Total Force concept long before Laird’s 
memorandum.  In 1967 the Air Force created what is now known as TFI when two C-141 
wings—one Active Duty and the other Air Force Reserve—at Norton AFB, CA began 
integrating aircraft operations and maintenance support functions (Oates, 2008).  TFI is 
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the current paradigm for implementing the Total Force Concept and exists to synergize 
efforts of Active Component and Reserve Component units with similar missions to more 
effectively leverage scarce resources in meeting combatant commander requirements 
(Department of the Air Force, 2007). 
It is worth spending some time clarifying Total Force terminology, especially as it 
pertains to the term component. There are three components in the Air Force: Active 
Duty (AD), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserves (AFR).  Often however, 
the ANG and AFR are referred to collectively as the Air Reserve Component (ARC).  
Alternatively, the Reserve Component (RC) refers to National Guard and Reserve forces 
collectively from any one service branch.  For this reason the terms ARC and RC are 
often used interchangeably.  Further, several terms can be used interchangeably to refer 
to Active Duty forces, such as Regular Air Force (RegAF) and Active Component (AC).  
This research will primarily use the terms AD and ARC, but understanding the other 
terms prevents confusion when comparing this research with other Total Force literature. 
Potential Benefits 
In addition to potentially reducing defense expenditures by realizing greater 
efficiency of resource utilization, TFI may provide additional benefits to the Air Force 
and other service branches.  One such benefit may be an improved public image.  The 
ARC has a stronger connection to the American public than the AD by virtue of working 
full-time in their local communities, being more involved in local organizations, and 
remaining at the same duty station for substantially longer periods.  Further, the shift 
from using the ARC as a strategic reserve during the Cold War to an operational force 
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beginning in Operation Desert Storm increased the awareness Americans have of the 
service of their friends and neighbors in the ARC (Department of Defense, 2008). 
Another possible benefit from TFI is improved retention and recruiting.  
Integrating the AD and ARC increases AD awareness of options for continued service 
offered by the ARC and thereby increases recruiting of AD members.  Recruiting AD 
members bolsters the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the ARC by 
capitalizing on existing service experience and saving resources that would otherwise be 
used to train new recruits who have no military experience (Johnson, Kniep, and Conroy, 
2013).  The Air Force realizes a significant cost savings over new accessions by 
transitioning AD members to the ARC, so recruiting AD members is a top priority for the 
ARC (Air Force Reserve Command, 2013).  Further, the ARC may enjoy higher retention 
of its own members by leveraging opportunities afforded by collaboration with AD units.  
The AD also may realize improved recruiting and retention because its members receive 
unique mentoring and development opportunities from working with the generally older 
and more experienced ARC members (Johnson, Kniep, and Conroy, 2013). 
Potential Challenges 
While the potential benefits of TFI are substantial, there are challenges associated 
with integration across the different components.  The first challenge is managing the 
different perspectives and perceptions of three fundamentally different organizational 
cultures to achieve synergy rather than dissonance.  The differences between the ANG 
and AFR are subtle, but the differences between the ARC and the AD are significant, and 
stereotyping is common (Sotallaro, 2007).  Organizational behavior literature (Colquitt, 
Lepine, and Wesson, 2012; Riche et. al, 2007) maintains that common experiences 
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typically supplant stereotypes and create mutual understanding, but misconceptions and 
animosity are significant short term challenges to bringing diverse populations together.  
Focus group members participating in research by Riche et. al (2007) relayed that at the 
extremes, the AD views the ARC as “weekend warriors” that are not competent at their 
job and have little respect for military customs, while the ARC views the AD as short-
sighted, inexperienced, and constantly rotating in and out (Riche et. al, 2007).  Years of 
AD and ARC Airmen working side-by-side during deployments supporting the Global 
War on Terror have generally helped to lessen the magnitude of misconception and 
misunderstanding between the AD and ARC, but each TFI initiative continually has to 
overcome initial misconception and stereotyping to succeed (Sotallaro, 2007). 
Another challenge associated with effectively employing TFI is navigating 
statutory constraints, particularly involving the ANG.  Unless operating in federal 
mobilization status, ANG members operate under Title 32 of the United States Code 
(USC), and their chain of command is associated with the state adjutant general and state 
governor.  Conversely, AD and AFR members operate under USC Title 10, as do ANG 
members when federally mobilized, and their chain of command is associated with the 
Secretary of Defense and the President.  Consequently, AD and AFR members may not 
exercise command over ANG members while they are serving under Title 32 status and 
vice versa.  This separation of command authority necessitates that TFI units maintain 
separate chains of command, particularly for administrative matters, which can 
undermine good order and discipline if members of one component are treated differently 
than members of the other component (Oates, 2008).  Furthermore, the requirements for 
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mobilizing ARC units are substantially more complex than mobilizing AD units and 
allow less flexibility in employing ARC units. 
Yet another challenge to TFI implementation is maintaining a sustainable 
operations tempo, which is relevant in the contexts of ARC volunteerism and AD tasking 
requirements.  Volunteerism is the concept within the ARC where individual members 
voluntarily take deployment taskings not associated with a unit mobilization (Department 
of Defense, 2008).  For example, an ARC member in a classic associate model TFI who 
fills a deployment requirement for the host unit exhibits volunteerism.  Moore (2009) 
contends that this concept is integral to successful TFI implementation because 
oftentimes TFI units have fewer manning authorizations than non-TFI units because of 
the purported efficiencies provided by the TFI.  Relying on volunteerism too heavily can 
have two negative repercussions.  First, ARC members may be dissatisfied with a unit 
climate that heavily promotes—or even expects—volunteerism, because the unit’s 
expectations may exceed the member’s willingness to deploy.  This expectation 
imbalance results in poor retention and esprit de corps.  The second negative consequence 
of relying on volunteerism is that the AD unit may not be able to meet its designed 
operational capability without ARC volunteers.  If the AD unit received insufficient ARC 
volunteers to fill a tasking then the AD unit would be forced to draw on other AD units 
for assistance, which could have cascading consequences (Moore, 2009). 
TFI Framework and Policy 
Total Force Integration translates from concept into reality under what is known 
as the associate program.  One of three associate relationships may exist between units 
involved in a TFI: classic associate (also known as reserve associate), active associate, 
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and ARC associate.  The name denotes which component serves as the associate in the 
TFI relationship, while the other component serves as the host.  The host component is 
not necessarily in control of the installation, but instead is in control of—or owns—the 
weapon system shared in the TFI (Department of the Air Force, 2007).  This research 
deals exclusively with the classic associate model where the AD unit is the host and the 
ARC unit is the associate.   
Under TFI each unit maintains its own chain of command, but purposeful inter-
unit coordination and alignment of equipment, facilities, and manpower ensures 
operational unity of effort and more efficient and effective use of resources.  
Implementing an approved TFI initiative begins with an integration plan (I-plan) which 
“sets the strategic direction for the integration initiative, serves as the basis for the 
development of the supporting implementing documents, and helps frame and define the 
measures for success” (Department of the Air Force, 2007).  Next, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is created between the 
associated units to delineate specific integration parameters, the most important of which 
is operational direction (OPDIR).  OPDIR is the means by which a member of one 
component directs the efforts of a subordinate from another component to reach mutual 
operational objectives.  The MOU/MOA includes a standing order from each commander 
that his or her subordinates will follow the OPDIR of the other unit’s personnel.  For 
example, an AFR Airman is ordered to follow the OPDIR of an AD shop chief.  The 
MOU/MOA also outlines the degree to which units will functionally integrate, which 
ideally includes being trained, tasked, inspected, and employed as one unified team 
(Department of the Air Force, 2007). 
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The Air Force’s primary policy document on TFI is Air Force Policy Directive 
(AFPD) 90-10, Total Force Integration Policy, while Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-
1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration, provides the guidance for policy 
implementation.  Additionally, the Total Force Enterprise Division within Headquarters 
Air Force (AF/A8XF) serves as the focal point for TFI support and implementation.  
Each Major Command (MAJCOM) has a staff office to provide closer management and 
support of TFI initiatives within the command.  Air Combat Command (ACC) serves as 
the lead command for RED HORSE and has direct oversight of three of the four TFI 
initiatives included in this research, while Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is responsible for 
the remaining initiative. 
RED HORSE 
While Air Force Civil Engineering (AFCE) traces its lineage to the Army Signal 
Corps during World War I, the RED HORSE mission set—a subset of AFCE—was born 
during the Vietnam War when contingency construction requirements, especially airfield 
construction, exceeded theater construction capabilities.  At that time the Air Force 
outsourced all of its new construction requirements to the Army Corps of Engineers and 
Navy SEABEEs, while Air Force Prime BEEF units provided maintenance and minor 
repair capabilities.  A severe backlog in Air Force construction requirements resulting 
from this arrangement, as well as the results of a study on AFCE capabilities, prompted 
Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, to advocate for a highly mobile organic heavy 
construction and repair force to meet Air Force construction and repair requirements in 
the Vietnam Theater.  As a result, the first two RED HORSE squadrons were activated, 
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trained, and deployed in 1965, with four more operational squadrons and a training 
squadron standing up before the end of the Vietnam War (Wheeler, 1987). 
In the years following the Vietnam War AFCE codified the organization, training, 
equipping, and employment of RED HORSE units in Air Force Regulation 85-25, which 
was replaced by AF Regulation 93-9, which was in turn replaced by Air Force Instruction 
(AFI) 10-209.  The progression from AF Regulation 85-25 to AFI 10-209 was 
evolutionary in nature and surprisingly little has changed in the way RED HORSE 
operates since its inception, which is not to say that RED HORSE has not changed at all, 
because lessons learned from previous operations are exactly what provided the impetus 
for AF Regulation or AFI revisions (Wendling, 2006).  Despite this stability, a perception 
exists that RED HORSE may need to make a revolutionary organizational change to 
better align with the requirements of the post-9/11/01 security environment (Kerr, 2012).  
Nevertheless, RED HORSE units continued to develop their reputation as a premiere 
construction force through involvement in every major conflict since Vietnam and 
numerous military operations other than war (MOOTW).   
The RED HORSE operational construct is centered on the hub-and-spoke concept 
using up to two hubs, each supporting several spokes.  Each hub consists of command, 
administrative, services, supply, maintenance, and medical elements which make a RED 
HORSE squadron self-sustaining if resupplied with consumable items. The spokes are 
comprised of one or more construction teams specializing in either horizontal or vertical 
construction.  Vertical construction includes new facilities and utilities while horizontal 
construction includes site preparation, roadways, and airfield pavements (Department of 
the Air Force, 1999). 
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One unique characteristic of RED HORSE squadrons is their special capabilities 
beyond standard construction.  These unique capabilities include asphalt and concrete 
batch plant and paving operations, directional drilling, minor explosive demolition, well 
drilling, quarry operations, materials testing, contingency airfield evaluation, pavement 
milling, crane operations, and Automatic Building Machine/Ultimate Building Machine 
(commonly known as K Span) operations.  Additionally, RED HORSE boasts a small 
contingent of engineers specializing in extremely rapid deployment via air insertion to 
perform site assessments (Department of the Air Force, 2010).  These special capabilities 
allow RED HORSE to undertake a wide variety of construction requirements with great 
flexibility and rapidity. 
RED HORSE squadrons are intended to deploy as an entire unit, which opposes 
the prevailing paradigm used by other expeditionary CE units that assemble ad hoc 
organizations with personnel from many locations.  Maintaining unit integrity develops 
the cohesiveness and readiness necessary to deliver a rapidly deployable force; one of the 
core competencies of RED HORSE (Department of the Air Force, 1999).  An Active 
Duty advanced echelon (ADVON) team must be able to respond to a contingency within 
12 hours, with the rest of the squadron responding within 72 hours (for both personnel 
and equipment).  Response times for ARC squadrons are 48 hours greater than the AD 
response times.  A response time is the elapsed time from when a unit receives a mission 
to when forces deploy to support that mission (Department of the Air Force, 2012). 
Since their inception, RED HORSE squadrons have been composed of roughly 
400 personnel of various Air Force Specialties (AFSs).  The current construct organizes 
the sixteen RED HORSE squadrons in the total force into ten 404-person squadron 
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equivalents.  Notionally, four squadron equivalents reside in the Regular Air Force, four 
squadron equivalents are in the Air Force Reserves, and five squadron equivalents are in 
the Air National Guard.  Each ARC squadron equivalent is divided between two 
squadrons that have complementary fractions of the 404 personnel so that two ARC 
“sister” squadrons can combine to form one squadron equivalent.  There are no mixed 
component sister squadron arrangements (e.g. an Air Force Reserve squadron paired with 
an Air National Guard squadron).  An effort is presently underway to redistribute 
manning authorizations across the RED HORSE enterprise to correct the disparity 
between the notional model and the real situation which was caused by numerous force 
structure changes in the past two decades (RED HORSE Program Office, 2013b). 
The 404 personnel that comprise a squadron equivalent are postured in nine 
different Unit Type Codes (UTCs)—twenty total UTCs—each with a specific function in 
the overall RED HORSE mission.  Of the 404 personnel, 311 are in Civil Engineer AFSs 
and are concentrated in the vertical and horizontal construction UTCs (4FPRS, 4FPRT, 
4FPRU, and 4FPRV) which have only CE personnel.  The remaining 93 non-engineer 
personnel are primarily postured in the beddown and support UTCs (4FPRX, 4FPRY, 
and 4FPRW) that make up the hubs in the hub-and-spoke concept (Department of the Air 
Force, 2012).  Figure 1, below, shows how the twenty UTCs combine to form the 404 
person squadron equivalent (RED HORSE Program Office, 2013b).  The colors in the 
UTC chart are only meant to distinguish between UTCs and don’t have any further 
meaning. 
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Figure 1: UTC Configuration 
 
RED HORSE squadrons do not support a peacetime flying mission like Prime 
BEEF squadrons; consequently, their peacetime mission is to prepare for their wartime 
mission.  In order to train for and practice their wartime mission of expeditionary 
construction and repair, RED HORSE squadrons use Troop Training Projects (TTPs) as 
an avenue to perform expeditionary construction in a non-expeditionary environment.  
These TTPs can be in support of RED HORSE or Prime BEEF related construction 
requirements and provide a dual benefit to both the supporting and supported units.  The 
supporting unit, the RED HORSE squadron executing the TTP, gains valuable training 
experience to hone its members’ construction skills. The supported unit receives a newly 
constructed facility that often costs considerably less than a similar contractor-built 
facility. 
RED HORSE TFI initiatives 
There are three active associate and four classic associate TFI initiatives involving 
RED HORSE squadrons (RHS).  As previously mentioned, the three active associate 
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initiatives are outside the scope this research.  The four classic associations are between 
the 819th RHS (AD) and 219th RHS (ANG) at Malmstrom AFB in Montana, the 820th 
RHS (AD) and 555th RHS (AFR) at Nellis AFB in Nevada, the 823rd RHS (AD) and 
556th RHS (AFR) at Hurlburt Field in Florida, and the 554th RHS (AD) and 254th RHS 
(ANG) at Andersen AFB in Guam.  The following sections will discuss the 
organizational and environmental contexts for the four TFI cases.  Table 1, below 
summarizes some key statistics (RED HORSE Program Office, 2013a). 
Table 1: Summary Case Information 
Location Unit Component Host Base MAJCOM 
Authorized 
Manning Commander Reports to 
Malmstrom 
AFB, MT 
819th AD 
AFGSC 
411 O-6 (s) 9th AF 
219th ANG 197 O-5 MTANG 
Nellis  
AFB, NV 
820th AD 
ACC 
548 O-6 12th AF 
555th AFR 209 O-6 622nd CEG 
Hurlburt Field, 
FL 
823rd AD 
AFSOC 
455 O-6 9th AF 
556th AFR 209 Vacant (O-6) 622nd CEG 
Andersen AFB, 
Guam 
554th AD 
PACAF 
158 O-5 36th CRG 
254th ANG 125 O-4 254th ABG 
 
I-plans were prepared at the outset of three of the four classic associate RED 
HORSE TFI initiatives.  In addition to ensuring a standardized organizational framework, 
the I-plan sets forth objectives, desired effects, and measures of effectiveness (MoEs) 
used to evaluate each TFI initiative once it reaches full operationally capability.  The 
objectives and MoEs common to the three existing I-plans are as follows (Brown and 
Manion, 2009). 
Objective 1. Provide uninterrupted RED HORSE forces to the Combatant Commander. 
Desired Effect: Synergize RegAF and Reserve component strengths to mitigate 
OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO risks. 
  
MoE 1.  Regular component OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO is at or below AFPD 36-
21 thresholds. Maintain minimum of a predictable 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio. 
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MoE 2.  Reserve component OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO is at or below Full-Time 
Support and Selected Reserve thresholds. Maintain a predictable 1:5 mobilization-
to-dwell ratio. 
 
Objective 2.  Support steady state training requirements. 
Desired Effect: Consolidate training activities to maximize the number of personnel 
trained while minimizing the time required doing so. 
 
MoE 3.  RegAF and Reserve RED HORSE combat readiness will be measured 
separately by using the current Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) 
system as set forth in CJCSM 3150.02, Global Status of Resources and Training 
System (GSORTS), and AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System. 
 
MoE 4.  Report UTC combat readiness using the Aerospace Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) reporting tool (ART) per AFI 10-244, Reporting Status of Aerospace 
Expeditionary Forces. These publications are supplemented by both ACC and 
AFRC, and provide the instructions for reporting unit readiness at a UIC (SORTS) 
and UTC (ART) level. 
 
Malmstrom AFB, Montana 
The 819th RHS and 219th RHS were the first RED HORSE TFI initiative.  The 
two units stood up in 1997 as a blended organization where the 819th RHS supplied 2/3 of 
the personnel and the 219th supplied the remaining 1/3 of the personnel (Hartzer, 2013).  
The manning paradigm shifted away from the additive model of the two squadrons 
combining to form one squadron equivalent to the 819th RHS becoming a full 404 person 
squadron in 2009.  The units share a compound where most facilities are integrated and 
occupied by both units (RED HORSE Program Office, 2013a). 
Another differentiating factor for this TFI initiative is the climate.  Unlike the 
other TFI squadrons that are all located in warm regions, the 819th RHS and 219th RHS 
are situated in a much colder area and have a limited construction season.  Consequently, 
these squadrons look to execute troop training projects at warmer locations during the 
winter months.   
 21 
The 819th RHS reports administratively and operationally to 9th Air Force of 
ACC, but receives host base support from the 341st Missile Wing of Air Force Global 
Strike Command (AFGSC).  The 219th RHS reports administratively and operationally to 
the Montana ANG, but receives host base support from the 120th Fighter Wing (ANG).  
The organizational chart for the Malmstrom TFI is shown below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Malmstrom TFI Organizational Chart 
 
As a classic association, the 819th RHS owns all the vehicles and equipment, but 
the 219th RHS is authorized to use the vehicles and equipment for MTANG missions 
through a memorandum of agreement (MOA).  The final distinguishing feature of this 
association is that no initiation documents for the TFI exist.  The two units have 
established informal and unwritten agreements regarding inter-unit integration and 
support based on lessons learned from their seventeen years working side-by-side (Total 
Force Enterprise Management Division, 2013). 
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Nellis AFB, Nevada 
When the 555th RHS was reactivated in 2001 at Nellis AFB they were associated 
with the 554th RHS at Osan AB, Korea and 254th RED HORSE Flight at Camp Murray, 
WA despite being physically located adjacent the 820th RHS.  The 820th RHS and 555th 
RHS formalized their existing resource sharing relationship as a TFI classic association 
after the 554th RHS and 254th RHS moved to Andersen AFB, Guam (Hartzer, 2013).  As 
part of the TFI agreement, the 555th RHS built facilities within the 820th RHS compound 
and makes use of 820th RHS facilities on drill weekends.  The 820th RHS reports 
administratively and operationally to 12th Air Force and receives host base support from 
the 99th Air Base Wing, both in ACC.  The 555th RHS reports operationally to the 622nd 
Civil Engineer Group (CEG) and administratively to the 926th Group, both in AFRC but 
located at different bases.  The organizational chart for the Nellis TFI units is shown 
below in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Nellis TFI Organizational Chart 
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Hurlburt Field, Florida 
The TFI at Hurlburt Field began in 2008 when the 556th RHS moved from 
Lackland AFB into the 823rd RHS’s compound at Hurlburt Field.  This is the youngest 
RED HORSE classic associate TFI initiative and is particularly unique because the 556th 
RHS commander position has been vacant since October 2012.  Another unique facet of 
this TFI is that it includes a CE contingency engineering school known as Silver Flag that 
is assigned as Detachment One of the 823rd RHS.  The 823rd RHS reports 
administratively and operationally to 9th Air Force in ACC and receives host base support 
from the 1st Special Operations Wing in Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC).  The 555th RHS reports operationally to the 622nd Civil Engineer Group (CEG) 
and administratively to the 919th Special Operations Wing, both in AFRC.  The 
organizational chart for the Hurlburt TFI is shown below in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Hurlburt TFI Organizational Chart 
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Andersen AFB, Guam 
The RED HORSE TFI initiative at Andersen is also relatively young, having been 
initiated in 2006 when the 554th RHS moved from Osan AB, Korea and the 254th Civil 
Engineer Squadron was redesignated as an RHS.  Like the Hurlburt TFI there is a Silver 
Flag site assigned to the AD squadron, but the difference is that the Silver Flag site at 
Andersen is still under construction.  The Silver Flag site is part of a massive ongoing 
construction endeavor known as the Pacific Regional Training Center (PRTC).  The 
PRTC entails operations and maintenance, MILCON, and troop-labor construction in 
excess of $220 million to provide training venues for combat support forces in the Pacific 
Command area of responsibility (AOR).  The PRTC also includes the 554th RHS 
compound, which is still under construction (Davit, Batherson, and Monkman, 2010). 
The 554th RHS and 254th RHS are also part of an additive TFI where each unit 
constitutes approximately one third of a standard 404 person squadron configuration and 
the 307th RHS (AFR) from Barksdale AFB in Louisiana provides the remaining third.  
The 307th RHS relationship to the Andersen units is based on war plans rather than a 
formal TFI, so the 307th RHS was outside the scope of this research.  The reduced size of 
the 554th RHS combined with the immense workload of the TFI resulted in a significant 
amount of augmentation, which has primarily been through the 254th RHS.  The 254th 
RHS has executed in excess of 8,000 MPA days per fiscal year since construction started 
on the PRTC.  In comparison, the other three TFIs have executed approximately 1,225 
MPA days each per fiscal year in the past five years. 
The final distinguishing feature of the Andersen TFI is the organizational 
structure of the two squadrons as depicted below in Figure 5.  First, the two squadrons are 
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assigned to PACAF rather than ACC.  Second, both squadrons are subsumed by several 
higher echelon organizations.  The 554th RHS is the only AD squadron that does not 
report directly to a Numbered Air Force because they are subordinate to the 36th 
Contingency Response Group (CRG) under the 36th Wing.  The 254th RHS is also a 
subordinate unit to a group, in this case the 254th Air Base Group.  Both units receive host 
base support from the 36th Wing. 
 
Figure 5: Andersen TFI Organizational Chart 
Methodology 
A nuance to the first three investigative questions that wasn’t previously 
discussed is that each question is really examining two ideas; namely, what an outcome is 
and who receives the outcome.  Consequently, the data needed to answer these questions 
must have a what component and a who component.  The data could conceivably come 
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from a variety of sources, but the reliability, validity, and availability of the data were the 
primary concern. 
Candidate Methodologies 
The questions could be examined from a quantitative perspective by examining 
metrics tracked by the individual units and their respective staff agencies, but up to this 
point no data has been collected specific to TFI contributions.  This means that construct 
validity—how related measures are to the concepts they are intended to measure—could 
be a significant concern (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002).  For example, it would be 
difficult to establish the contributions of a TFI by comparing the readiness reporting 
figures between TFI units and non-TFI units because a number of contextual factors 
could contribute to the differences. 
The questions could also be examined from a qualitative perspective using a 
number of methodologies such as Delphi methods, grounded theory, and case study 
research.  A Delphi study’s iterative and exploratory nature is well suited to the research 
question, but the focus on converging opinions and future circumstances are limitations 
to its utility in answering the investigative questions (Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn, 
2007).  Grounded theory is applicable to the exploratory nature of these questions and 
often uses interviews and data coding, both of which were used in this research, but its 
primary aim of creating a theoretical framework is beyond the scope of this research.  
Case study research, however, is adept at incorporating multiple data sources within 
easily definable contextual domains (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), which make it very 
suitable to answer the investigative questions using the available data. 
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According to Yin (2009), the case study research method is appropriate for 
answering “how” and “why” questions, particularly when the research pertains to 
contemporary phenomena which are not easily influenced or controlled by the researcher.  
The case study researcher utilizes documents, archival records, artifacts, interviews, 
direct observations, and participant-observation to expand the knowledge in a subject 
area in either an exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive manner.  In contrast to 
experiments that seek to control everything except a few variables of interest, case study 
research examines a problem within its native context to establish a holistic perspective 
of the problem and its contextual interactions (Yin, 2009). 
Case studies should use one data source to corroborate or contend inferences 
made from other sources.  Inferences that are consistent across multiple data sources are 
more convincing than inferences supported by only one source or disputed between 
sources.  A common analysis technique used in the case study research method is cross-
case synthesis.  Cross-case synthesis requires multiple cases that replicate each other 
either literally or in fundamental theory so that data from multiple cases can be 
synthesized into a more generalized explanation or description of the research problem 
(Yin, 2009).  The four classic association RED HORSE TFI initiatives are an example of 
cases replicating a fundamental theory. 
Structured Interviews 
Interviews have been used as a research tool for millennia to gather data from 
people experienced with a phenomenon of interest.  Research interviews are systematic in 
nature to ensure robust data and conclusions.  Interview format can vary in formality 
from a survey style with limited answer choices on one end of the spectrum (high 
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formality) to a completely open-ended dialogue on the other side of the spectrum (low 
formality.  Structured interviews are near the middle of this spectrum and consist of 
targeted questions that are mostly open-ended (Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele, 2012).  
Qualitative research literature (e.g. Barbour, 2001; Daniel, 2012; Tongco, 2007) suggests 
using purposive sampling for interviews, especially for use in case studies (Yin, 2009).  
In short, purposive sampling entails selecting subjects because of their unique 
qualifications relevant to the purpose of the research (Daniel, 2012).  The deliberate 
selection bias of purposive sampling provides both strength and weakness.  Selecting 
only qualified subjects enhances the internal validity—the propensity to establish 
causation—of a study, but doing so limits the external validity—the ability to generalize 
findings (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002).  Another relevant sampling technique is 
snowball sampling, which is acquiring new subjects from the recommendations of 
previous subjects.  Snowball sampling is one type of purposive sampling because the 
original selection criteria must be applied prospective new subjects to determine if they 
are to be included in the research (Daniel, 2012). 
Textual Analysis 
Savin-Baden and Major (2012) propose a five step process for handling and 
analyzing interview data to create meaningful information.  The first step is to cut each 
interview transcript into meaningful segments that each communicates one idea.  Next, 
each segment is given a code that briefly labels the idea discussed in that segment.  Codes 
are then categorized into groupings that logically arrange the ideas being presented in the 
interview into like areas (categories) that are inclusive and mutually exclusive.  The 
researcher then converts the code categories into themes, which is where the analysis 
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process moves from description to synthesis and evaluation.  Finally, the researcher 
creates tables and figures to communicate the codes, categories, and themes (Savin-
Baden and Major, 2012). 
There are more specific tools within the textual analysis framework discussed 
above, such as content analysis, domain analysis, and thematic analysis.  Content analysis 
examines the frequency with which words and phrases are used as well as the patterns in 
which they are used to characterize the text.  Knowing frequency and patterns of use 
assists in creating categories and themes.  Domain analysis assists theme creation by 
arranging codes and categories based on their semantic relationship to each other.  
Thematic analysis examines the text in a holistic manner based on intuition that comes 
with being very familiar with the text.  This tool is often used last because previous tools 
increase familiarity with the text (Savin-Baden and Major, 2012). 
Textual analysis can be accomplished by hand or using computer software.  
ATLAS.ti is a qualitative research software tool to facilitate textual analysis.  The 
program supports text, photos, video, maps, and a host of other media, which are termed 
primary documents.  ATLAS.ti defines the data segments from the cut phase as 
quotations, which can be created and modified as the researcher assigns codes the 
primary document.  Categorization occurs as the researcher creates code families.   
Semantic relationships, or links, can be added between codes and code families 
based on intuitive connection or co-occurrence.  Co-occurrence is where the quotation 
associated with one code is the same as, embedded by, or overlapping the quotation 
associated with another code (Muhr and Friese, 2004).  ATLAS.ti provides a count of 
how many times two codes co-occur as well as a C-coefficient that measures the 
Equation 1: Co-occurrence 
Coefficient 
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frequency of co-occurrence relative to each code’s occurrence.  The formula for the C-
coefficient is 
∁= 𝑛12(𝑛1+𝑛2)−𝑛12 
where n12 is the number of co-occurrences of code 1 and code 2, while n1 and n2 are the 
number of occurrences of code 1 and code 2, respectively.  A c-coefficient is susceptible 
to the influence of high code occurrences, so ATLAS.ti flags c-coefficients where the 
ratio of n1 to n2 is beyond an established threshold.  These flagged entries merit further 
scrutiny by the researcher to determine if a link exists (Scientific Software Development, 
2014).  Co-occurrence tables, network diagrams based on semantic relationships, and 
various reports from ATLAS.ti facilitate the convert and create steps of the textual 
analysis process. 
Summary 
This section provided the requisite background to support the subsequent analysis 
of RED HORSE TFI by drawing on existing articles, documents, presentations, and 
reports.  The TFI discussion included the historical context for TFI, its purported benefits 
and challenges, and the associate program framework and policy.  RED HORSE topic 
areas included doctrine, organization, operations, and a profile of the four classic 
associate RED HORSE TFI initiatives.  These contextual areas were the basis of applying 
the case study research methodology focusing on textual analysis to answer the 
investigative questions posed in Chapter I. 
  
(1) 
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III.  Methodology 
The methodology chapter delineates the data collection and analysis mechanisms 
employed to investigate RED HORSE total force integration (TFI).  This research 
utilized case study research methods to synthesize a variety of sources to explore the 
RED HORSE TFI topic area and answer the research question posed in Chapter I.  
Specific sources scrutinized include structured interviews conducted with senior 
members of RED HORSE units in TFI initiatives as well as documents from those units.  
The topics to be discussed in this chapter include the overall case study research design, a 
deeper exploration of the structured interviews that were the cornerstone of the 
methodology, and the data processing and analysis techniques used to translate the data 
into useable information. 
Research Design 
As introduced in Chapter I, the research question in view is, “what are the 
beneficial and non-beneficial outcomes of TFI initiatives between RED HORSE 
organizations from the perspective of the units themselves and RED HORSE enterprise, 
and what actions can improve the benefit of these outcomes?”  This question was further 
expanded in the four investigative questions listed below.  
• How do TFI units and the RED HORSE enterprise benefit from TFI? 
• What disbenefits to TFI units and the RED HORSE enterprise result from 
TFI? 
• How do contextual factors contribute to realizing benefits and disbenefits 
from TFI? 
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• How might contextual factors be influenced to make TFI initiatives more 
beneficial to the constituent units, RED HORSE enterprise, and the Air Force? 
Answering these questions requires data that demonstrate the outcomes of RED HORSE 
TFI as well as significant contextual data to identify the factors.  Available quantitative 
data were not specific enough to isolate the contributions TFI initiatives make to their 
constituent units so a qualitative methodology—case study research—was adopted to 
collect and analyze data suitable for answering the investigative questions. 
This research implemented the case study research method by investigating four 
TFI initiatives involving RED HORSE squadrons (RHS).  The four cases were the classic 
associations between the 819th RHS (AD) and 219th RHS (ANG) at Malmstrom AFB in 
Montana, the 820th RHS (AD) and 555th RHS (AFR) at Nellis AFB in Nevada, the 823rd 
RHS (AD) and 556th RHS (AFR) at Hurlburt Field in Florida, and the 554th RHS (AD) 
and 254th RHS (ANG) at Andersen AFB in Guam.  Data from these cases were the 
initiation documents (e.g. Integration Plans, MOUs) from each TFI initiative and the 
perspectives of senior members in each squadron gained from structured interviews.  
These interviews were the mechanism for eliciting data to characterize the contributions 
TFI initiatives make to the units involved. 
Interview Sampling 
Interview respondents consisted of senior officers and senior enlisted members 
from each of the eight TFI units who were selected purposively to elicit operational and 
strategic level perspectives on RED HORSE TFI.  The selection criteria established that 
each unit be represented by a minimum of one officer and one enlisted member whose 
time in that unit was within the past two years or during an especially formative period of 
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the TFI relationship.  Further, the sampling pool had to exhibit approximate parity 
between officer and enlisted perspectives as well as between active duty (AD) and air 
reserve component (ARC) perspectives.  Using selection criteria that target a 
representative sample of the relevant population enhances external validity compared to 
selecting participants based on their experience alone (Daniel, 2012).  Another factor 
used to screen potential interview subjects was the breadth of their RED HORSE TFI 
experience, with experience in multiple units or relevant staff agencies being especially 
desirable. 
Using the above criteria, a pool of over forty interview candidates was reduced to 
the twenty subjects interviewed.  The response rate for interviews was one hundred 
percent.  All contacted prospective interviewees expressed willingness to participate, 
although one candidate recommended several other people as better candidates than 
himself.  The sample size of twenty represented a balance between gathering multiple 
perspectives from each unit with ensuring a reasonable analysis workload and satisfying 
Air Force policy requirements.  The fact that the interviews for each case reached a 
saturation point of ideas supports twenty as a satisfactory sample size.  The saturation 
point is where further interviews do not yield any new ideas, only confirmation of 
previously identified ideas (Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele, 2012). 
Interview Protocol 
Interview questions were created to directly target each aspect of the research 
question as broken down into the four investigative questions.  A pilot study of five 
interviews afforded the opportunity to iteratively test, revise, and retest interview 
questions to ensure a suitable questioning format, improve clarity, and reduce question 
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bias.  Next, the final interview questions, relevant protocol information (e.g. 
confidentiality, academic freedom), and text to facilitate a natural interview flow were 
compiled to create the interview guide, which is included in Appendix A.  The interview 
guide was submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) as part of a human subjects 
research exemption request.  This exemption request was approved, and the letter 
granting the exemption is included in Appendix B. 
The researcher contacted prospective interviewees via email or telephone to gauge 
interest in participation, screen interviewees based on their experience, and solicit 
referrals of other prospective interviewees.  Interviewees were given the interview guide 
three business days prior to the interview to allow the interviewees to reflect on their 
experience and consider how they would answer the questions during the interview.  This 
standard amount of reflection time, along with a list in the interview guide of topic areas 
where outcomes and factors may exist, was meant to mitigate availability bias—the 
tendency to focus on recent experiences and neglect older ones.  Interviewees also signed 
a consent form (included in Appendix C) before participating in the interview to 
acknowledge their understanding of the interview protocol, data handling, confidentiality, 
and grounds of their participation. 
During the interview the researcher utilized a conference telephone in a 
conference room at AFIT, while the interviewee was in a place of their choosing—
usually the interviewee’s office.  The researcher read each definition or question from the 
interview guide verbatim to the interviewee and asked follow up questions as necessary 
to clarify ambiguities in interviewee responses.  Despite the uniform structure and 
definitions provided in the interview guide, interviewees often strayed from the question 
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at hand to discuss questions that had not yet been asked or tangential topics.  This was 
particularly prevalent in the questions about benefits and disbenefits, because discussing 
the factors contributing to those outcomes came naturally when explaining the outcomes.  
Consequently, the researcher recounted previously identified factors during the later 
questions about factors to elicit further explanation.  While an effort was made to keep 
interviewees on topic, a natural interview flow was more important than maintaining 
strict relatedness between questions and answers because the post-interview analysis 
necessitated reorganizing answers into common themes that transcended individual 
questions. 
Data Processing 
ATLAS.ti, a qualitative research software tool, was the primary mechanism for 
managing and analyzing the interview data.  First, each interview was transcribed using 
Dragon Naturally Speaking voice-to-text software.  Next, each interview transcript was 
imported into ATLAS.ti where it was coded to characterize the ideas expressed by the 
respondents.  Coding the interviews consisted of two rounds performed solely by the 
researcher; the first round to identify and label all the relevant segments of the interviews, 
and the second round to organize and refine the coding.  Interview coding is naturally 
iterative, so even in the first round previously coded interviews were frequently revisited 
and the codes modified or additional codes applied based on developments in later 
interviews.  For example, a respondent may use a word or phrase repeatedly, which 
prompted creating a code to capture that word or phrase, and that code would be applied 
to previous interviews because the code described an idea better than an existing code, or 
Equation 2: Co-occurrence 
Coefficient 
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described an idea that was not previously coded.  The initial round of coding yielded ten 
code families comprised of 277 unique codes applied to 1155 quotations.  The code 
families as well as many of the codes were created deductively, or top-down, from the 
research questions.  The first word of each code in ATLAS.ti was its code family, but for 
brevity the code family label is omitted in this document (i.e. the code Benefit: Continuity 
in ATLAS.ti is shown as Continuity). 
The second round of coding commenced after all the interviews were coded and 
had two objectives.  The first objective was to examine the entire list of codes to merge 
redundant codes and ensure each code was applied consistently across all the interviews.  
The second round yielded the same ten code families now comprising 246 unique codes 
applied to 1129 quotations.  The second objective was to further categorize the ten code 
families into subfamilies.  The subfamilies were created inductively, or bottom-up, from 
the individual codes.  Assigning codes to a subfamily was a subjective process because 
codes were assigned to only one subfamily even though they might fit into more than one 
subfamily.  Also, a couple codes were not assigned to a subfamily.  For example, the 
code vague mention of overall benefits was not assigned to a subfamily because it was a 
sweeping statement across the domain of the entire benefits code family.  A list of code 
families and subfamilies is shown below in Figure 6, while the entire list of codes is 
located in Appendix D. 
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Additional Research 
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Benefits 
   Resources 
   Training 
   Teamwork 
Collaboration 
Communication 
Definition of Success 
Disbenefits 
   Difficulty 
   Missed Opportunities 
   Resources 
Factors 
   Attitudes 
   Component Characteristics 
   Environmental 
   Management 
   Resources 
   Training 
Improvements 
   Higher Echelons 
   Organizational 
   Resources 
   Training 
   Unit Interfaces 
Observations 
Figure 6: Code Families and Subfamilies 
 
Outcomes discussed by interview respondents could apply to one or more of the 
three primary stakeholders in a TFI association; namely, the active duty unit, the air 
reserve component unit, and the RED HORSE enterprise.  When a respondent relayed an 
outcome that clearly applied to only one of the three stakeholders then the quotation was 
coded as a benefit to that stakeholder.  This stakeholder code was in addition to the code 
describing the outcome itself, which enabled calculating a co-occurrence between the 
outcome code and stakeholder code to determine which stakeholder was the primary 
recipient of the outcome, also known as a stakeholder tag.  Not every occurrence of an 
outcome code included a stakeholder tag, which was the case when the quotation either 
associated an outcome with multiple stakeholders equally or made the association hard to 
distinguish.  Factors were also coded concurrently, or tagged, with benefits and 
disbenefits in a similar manner to facilitate co-occurrence calculations. 
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Analysis 
Content analysis, domain analysis, and thematic analysis were the primary 
analytical tools to extract useful information from the interviews.  Content analysis was 
utilized to establish a precedence of outcomes and factors, such as the most frequently 
occurring benefits and most frequently occurring factors.  ATLAS.ti facilitated content 
analysis by providing reports on frequency and distribution of word usage and code 
occurrence.  Next, domain analysis entailed linking each outcome with one or more 
factors (e.g. factor A tends to be related to outcome X).  ATLAS.ti enabled domain 
analysis using co-occurrence calculations, code linking, and network diagrams.  The 
criteria for establishing a formal link between a factor and a benefit or disbenefit code 
was that a substantial portion of the occurrences of an outcome code needed to have a 
factor tag.  Generally speaking, substantial meant that the C-coefficient for the two codes 
had to be at least 0.1or more than two interview respondents strongly emphasized the 
link.  There were very few co-occurrences between improvement codes and factor codes, 
so the linking process for those two areas was mostly based on intuition and code name 
similarities.  Finally, thematic analysis looks at the data holistically which was most 
helpful in synthesizing related outcome-factor relationships.  Network diagrams within 
ATLAS.ti, as well as grouping codes into families, were integral to thematic analysis. 
Summary 
This research scrutinized four RED HORSE TFI initiatives through the case study 
methodology to examine TFI application across the RED HORSE enterprise.  Twenty 
interviews were conducted with purposively sampled senior members of each RED 
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HORSE squadron.  ATLAS.ti qualitative software was utilized to perform data 
processing and textual analysis on interview transcripts using content, domain, and 
thematic analysis concepts.  
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the product of the data collection and 
analysis methodology presented in the previous chapter.  The first section presents the 
information derived from the interview data to answer each of the investigative questions.  
The second section addresses several additional areas from the data collection that 
provided additional insight into the effectiveness of RED HORSE TFI initiatives. 
Answering the Investigative Questions 
The four investigative questions created the framework of the interview questions 
and directed the coding process.  The following sections address each investigative 
question by delineating the findings in the associated code family.  Each code family is 
examined in terms of the specific codes within the family and then as a more aggregated 
perspective using only the code subfamilies. 
Benefits Derived from Total Force Integration 
The first investigative question of this research was “how do TFI units and the 
RED HORSE enterprise benefit from TFI?”  As discussed in Chapter III, to the 
maximum extent possible benefits were given a stakeholder tag to identify the primary 
recipient of that benefit occurrence.  Table 2, below lists each benefit code (arranged by 
subfamily), the code’s total occurrences, and how many occurrences were associated with 
each stakeholder (stakeholder tag).  As discussed in Chapter III, not every occurrence of a 
benefit code included a stakeholder tag; therefore, the overall number of occurrences is 
not the sum of the respective stakeholder occurrences. 
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Table 2: Benefit Occurrences and Stakeholder Association 
Code Name (total occurrences) Subfamily 
Stakeholder Tags 
AD ARC Enterprise 
Covering manpower shortfalls (46) resources 21 9 3 
Access to vehicles/equipment (34) resources 0 28 0 
Access to facilities (24) resources 8 13 0 
Deployment augmentation (21) resources 7 5 4 
Cost savings from shared resources (14) resources 1 4 6 
Manpower/logistics synergy (14) resources 2 2 4 
Access to more robust logistics (9) resources 7 0 0 
Additional source of resources (9) resources 1 7 0 
Vehicle Maintenance (9) resources 4 3 0 
Recruiting AD members (7) resources 0 5 0 
Good remuneration (5) resources 0 4 0 
Federal resources for state mission (4) resources 0 3 0 
Recruiting from attractive situation (4) resources 0 3 0 
Reduced Ops/Perstempo (3) resources 1 1 0 
Able to meet req # of sq equivalents (2) resources 0 0 1 
Ability to work with other units (14) teamwork 6 4 2 
Pre-existing teams (12) teamwork 0 1 9 
Inspections/exercises (10) teamwork 5 5 0 
Administrative help (7) teamwork 6 0 0 
Enhanced morale (5) teamwork 1 3 0 
Re-blueing effect (5) teamwork 0 3 0 
Template/proof of concept (5) teamwork 0 0 2 
Networking (4) teamwork 1 1 1 
Crossflow to execute staff guidance (2) teamwork 0 0 2 
Access to expertise (52) training 17 23 0 
Special Capabilities Training (25) training 3 16 1 
Troop training projects (21) training 7 12 0 
Continuity (20) training 13 0 1 
Offering training opportunities (12) training 0 6 0 
Better trained craftsmen (11) training 1 4 3 
Interoperability (7) training 2 1 2 
Careerfield professional development (6) training 2 1 0 
Training synergy (6) training 0 0 1 
Opportunity to hone leadership skills (5) training 1 2 0 
Vague mention of overall benefits (16) N/A 0 5 0 
 
The most frequently cited benefits that AD units derived from their TFI 
arrangements were access to resources such as additional manpower, funding, and small 
equipment items, as well as training resources such as continuity and AFSC-related 
expertise provided by ARC members.  Prominent benefits to the ARC units from their 
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TFI arrangements were access to resources such as facilities, equipment, and vehicles, as 
well as training opportunities such as special capabilities training, troop training projects, 
and AD subject matter experts (SMEs).  The benefit most frequently attributed to the 
RED HORSE enterprise was having pre-existing TFI teams from which to meet 
operational requirements.  These pre-existing teams meant that deployments and troop 
training projects would involve less of the friction that comes with team building.  Cost 
savings and other synergistic effects were also frequently occurring benefits to the 
enterprise. 
The most commonly occurring benefits tended to fall within the resources and 
training subfamilies.  In fact, 370 of the 450 total occurrences (82%) in the benefits code 
family are codes in the resources and training subfamilies.  Table 3, below, depicts the 
distribution of benefits among subfamilies and stakeholders in terms of the number of 
occurrences and percentage of the overall benefits code family occurrences.  As discussed 
in Chapter III, not every occurrence of a benefit code included a stakeholder tag; 
therefore, the overall occurrences and percentages are not the sum of their respective 
stakeholder occurrences and percentages. 
Table 3: Benefit Occurrences by Subfamily and Stakeholder 
Code Overall AD ARC Enterprise 
Subfamily # % # % # % # % 
Training 165 37% 46 10% 65 14% 8 2% 
Resources 205 46% 52 12% 87 19% 18 4% 
Teamwork 64 14% 18 4% 17 4% 16 4% 
N/A - "vague" 16 4% 0 0% 5 1% 0 0% 
Total 450 100% 116 26% 174 39% 42 9% 
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Disbenefits from Total Force Integration 
The second investigative question was “what disbenefits to TFI units and the RED 
HORSE enterprise result from TFI?”  In the same way as benefits, the disbenefits may be 
realized by one or more of the three stakeholders and were coded accordingly, but not all 
occurrences of a disbenefit included a stakeholder tag.  Consequently the total 
occurrences shown in parentheses in the leftmost column are not the sum of the 
respective stakeholder tags.  Table 4, below lists each code and the occurrences 
associated with each stakeholder. 
Table 4: Disbenefit Occurrences and Stakeholder Association 
Code Name (total occurrences) Subfamily 
Stakeholder Tags 
AD ARC Enterprise 
Leadership/management challenge (43) Difficulty 9 5 5 
Hassle to accommodate other unit (21) Difficulty 8 2 0 
Lost training when equipment unavailable (13) Difficulty 0 6 0 
Perceived as less of a squadron (9) Difficulty 3 4 0 
Reinventing the TFI wheel (7) Difficulty 0 5 0 
Overcrowding the compound (4) Difficulty 1 0 0 
Inability to adapt (3) Difficulty 1 0 1 
Inability to work taskings together (25) Missed Opportunity 7 2 3 
Constraints to using ARC (22) Missed Opportunity 5 4 1 
Missed opportunity to gain benefits (14) Missed Opportunity 1 3 1 
Limited COCOM missions (1) Missed Opportunity 1 0 0 
TFI-induced burden on resources (14) Resources 8 0 1 
Overstating capabilities (9) Resources 0 0 8 
Risk from interdependencies (6) Resources 3 0 3 
Under-resourced because TFI relationship (5) Resources 0 1 0 
Insufficient logistics (3) Resources 0 1 0 
Duplication of resources (2) Resources 0 0 1 
AD make big decisions (1) Resources 0 1 0 
Vague mention of overall disbenefits (10) N/A 2 1 1 
 
AD units commonly experienced disbenefits from their TFI arrangements in 
added difficulties such as leadership and management challenges or hassles that arose 
from working with their TFI teammate.  Inabilities to deploy together and execute TTPs 
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together, general constraints to leveraging ARC members and resources, as well as the 
TFI-induced drain on resources were other frequently cited disbenefits.  The most 
recurrent disbenefits to the ARC units from their TFI arrangements were difficulties such 
as leadership and management challenges, “reinventing the wheel” when new AD 
leadership arrived, being perceived as subordinate to their AD counterpart, and being 
unable to accomplish training when vehicles or equipment were unavailable.  Another 
notable disbenefit to the ARC units was missing opportunities to collaborate and leverage 
their TFI teammate due to ARC-centric constraints. 
The code leadership/management challenges was widely occurring and 
encompassed many situations that ultimately boiled down to an increased difficulty for 
squadron leadership and supervisors to navigate a given situation involving the TFI.  A 
prominent example was diffusing resentment or disagreement arising from differences in 
priorities, policies, and culture between components.  Another frequently occurring 
example pertained to the appropriate application of ARC member skills, especially when 
those members were placed in leadership positions.  Other instances of management-
related challenges were where additional administration, planning, funding, or resources 
were required to collaborate with TFI partners.  These situations were discussed enough 
to merit their own code, hassle to accommodate other unit. 
The most prevalent disbenefit to the RED HORSE enterprise was that TFI created 
the impression of greater capability on paper than what actually existed.  This overstating 
capability primarily related to the two additive TFIs and TFI in a deployed setting where 
a disparity may exist between what is expected from a fielded force based on the 
manpower numbers and the actual capability of that fielded force based its composition.  
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For example, the entire TFI team from Andersen AFB may not be available for a 
deployment because the two units have different dwell requirements.  Also, in the 
deployed setting, a fielded force composed of mostly ARC members may have more 
apprentice level members because having only thirty-nine training days per year means it 
takes longer to upgrade ARC members. 
The most commonly occurring disbenefits tended to fall within the difficulty 
subfamily.  Also, there was a slight tendency for the AD unit to be the recipient of the 
disbenefits.  Table 5, below, depicts the distribution of disbenefits among subfamilies and 
stakeholders in terms of number of occurrences and percentage of the overall disbenefits 
code family occurrences. 
Table 5: Disbenefit Occurrences by Subfamily and Stakeholder 
Code Overall AD ARC Enterprise 
Subfamily # % # % # % # % 
Difficulty 100 47% 22 10% 22 10% 6 3% 
Missed Opportunity 62 29% 14 7% 9 4% 5 2% 
Resources 40 19% 12 5% 3 1% 13 6% 
N/A - "vague" 10 5% 2 1% 1 0% 1 0% 
Total 212 100% 49 23% 34 16% 25 12% 
 
Factors Affecting TFI Outcomes 
The third investigative question was “how do contextual factors contribute to 
realizing benefits and disbenefits from TFI?”  Discussing factors yielded the widest 
variety of responses and largest number of codes—there were 74 different codes in the 
factors code family.  Table 6, below lists the factors linked to at least two outcomes. The 
majority of factors were linked to either benefits or disbenefits.  The few factors linked to 
both benefits and disbenefits were either component characteristics or environmental and 
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didn’t have an explicit polarity such as lacking or good.  An example is ARC 
longevity/stability, which allows the ARC to provide continuity for the frequently rotating 
AD, but also requires the ARC to frequently build new relationships with AD and 
navigate the AD’s tendency to “reinvent the wheel.”  In this case this inherent 
characteristic of the ARC reaps a benefit for the AD and a disbenefit for the ARC.  
Consult Appendix E for the entire list of links between factors and outcomes. 
Table 6: Prominent Factors and Links to Outcomes 
Code Name (total occurrences) 
Links Code 
Benefits Disbenefits Subfamily 
Good rapport (38) 4 0 Attitudes 
Cooperation - lacking (13) 0 2 Attitudes 
Cooperation - positive (32) 2 0 Attitudes 
Trust - sufficient (11) 2 0 Attitudes 
ARC schedule (21) 0 3 Component Characteristics 
Different dwell rates (19) 0 3 Component Characteristics 
Differing organizational culture (22) 0 3 Component Characteristics 
Ancillary burden on ARC time (11) 0 2 Component Characteristics 
ARC longevity/stability (17) 1 1 Component Characteristics 
Frequent AD rotation (22) 1 1 Component Characteristics 
Local connections (7) 2 0 Component Characteristics 
Co-location (30) 6 0 Environmental 
Additive TFI to make composite 404 (24) 1 2 Environmental 
PRTC (19) 2 1 Environmental 
Support from civilian sector (3) 3 0 Environmental 
Deployed in place (6) 0 2 Environmental 
Different priorities (19) 0 3 Management 
Adaptive application of ARC member skills (18) 2 0 Management 
Insufficient analysis (4) 0 2 Management 
Planning - insufficient (12) 0 2 Management 
Insufficient mandays (10) 0 3 Resources 
Funding - sufficient (8) 2 0 Resources 
Disparate capability between components (6) 0 2 Training 
Totals 28 32 
  
The factors most frequently linked to benefits included the units being co-located, 
good rapport between unit members, and strong support from the civilian sector.  
Disbenefits were most often linked to factors such as the ARC’s schedule (i.e. one 
weekend per month and two weeks per year), different dwell requirements for AD and 
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ARC forces, differing organizational culture between components, the components 
having different priorities, and an insufficient allotment of mandays.  Table 7, below, 
incorporates all 74 factors to show the links between outcomes and factor code 
subfamilies. 
Table 7: Factor Links by Subfamily 
Code Subfamily Links Total 
(number of codes) Benefits Disbenefits Total Occurrences 
Attitudes (14) 9 8 17 177 
Component Characteristics (14) 4 17 21 172 
Environmental (21) 14 9 23 134 
Management (15) 6 10 16 102 
Resources (5) 3 4 7 52 
Training (5) 2 3 5 46 
Total 38 51 89 682 
 
Environmental factors and the intrinsic characteristics of each component were 
the two code families most frequently linked to outcomes.  For the disbenefits, 
component characteristics and management-related factors were especially prominent, 
although environmental factors and attitudes also demonstrated many links.  For benefits, 
environmental factors and attitudes were the most frequently linked factors.  An 
interesting characteristic of the component characteristics subfamily is that it exhibited 
approximately one third more links per code than the other subfamilies. 
Improving TFI Outcomes 
The fourth research question was “how might contextual factors be influenced to 
make TFI initiatives more beneficial to the constituent units, RED HORSE enterprise, 
and the Air Force?”  To assist in answering this question, each respondent was explicitly 
asked what they would do to improve TFI, and those improvement suggestions were 
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linked to the contextual factors discussed in the previous section.  The respondents 
provided 73 suggested improvements that yielded 38 unique improvement suggestions 
(codes) which were grouped into five subfamilies.  Those codes exhibiting multiple 
occurrences or greater than three factor links are displayed below in Table 8. 
Table 8: Prominent Improvements and Factor Links 
Code Name Code Factor 
(occurrences) Subfamily Links 
Enterprise-level perspective (4) Higher Echelons 3 
Better staff level coordination of TTPs (2) Higher Echelons 4 
Better staff level synchronizing resources (2) Higher Echelons 3 
Address readiness reporting implications of additive TFI (2) Higher Echelons 2 
Better understanding/familiarity across community (1) Higher Echelons 5 
Submit joint training plan to ACC (1) Higher Echelons 5 
Unified command structure (5) Organizational 3 
RED HORSE wing/groups (4) Organizational 3 
Additive TFI model as standard (3) Organizational 2 
Funding specifically for TFI (7) Resources 3 
Carve out TTP money to facilitate planning (2) Resources 2 
Provide funding to cover TFI-induced burden (2) Resources 4 
Provide mandays/funding to keep ARC proficiency up (2) Resources 3 
Reduce ARC recurring CBT requirements (4) Training 3 
More emphasis on planning (5) Unit Interfaces 1 
Sync deployments (4) Unit Interfaces 4 
Force collaboration (3) Unit Interfaces 4 
Propagating best practices (2) Unit Interfaces 3 
Dialog of each component's needs & way ahead (1) Unit Interfaces 4 
Involve ARC in deployments to maintain viability (1) Unit Interfaces 4 
 
The most cited improvement was to provide funding that is directly tied to the TFI 
initiative which was manifested in two codes, funding specifically for TFI and provide 
funding to cover TFI-induced burden.  The former pertained to enhancing the TFI 
relationship by providing funding earmarked for collaborative activities, while the intent 
of the latter was offsetting the increase in AD resource expenditures from maintaining 
vehicles, equipment, and facilities that are used by two units.  Another prominent 
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improvement idea manifested across two codes, unified command structure and RED 
HORSE wing/groups, was to formally unite the command structure to promote common 
goals and unity of effort.  A third commonly expressed improvement idea was to make a 
more deliberate effort to work together as conveyed in the codes more emphasis on 
planning, sync deployments, and force collaboration.  Table 9, below, summarizes all the 
occurrences of improvement codes and factor links by subfamily. 
Table 9: Improvements Subfamilies and Factor Links 
Subfamily Codes Occurrences Factor Links 
Higher Echelons 11 18 30 
Organizational 7 16 18 
Resources 6 15 17 
Training 6 9 15 
Unit Interfaces 8 18 25 
Additional Insight into TFI 
Several interview questions pertained to relevant data that was not explicitly 
addressed by the four investigative questions.  These questions were included to capture a 
broader sense of the context of each TFI initiative and are the basis of the six code 
families that have yet to be discussed.  Two of these code families provided added insight 
into how successful or unsuccessful TFI initiatives are perceived to be, as well as the 
reasons for those perceptions.  Another two code families explored the degree to which 
TFI units interact.  One of the code families consisted of suggestions for future RED 
HORSE related research and will be discussed in Chapter V.  The last code family is a 
collection of observations made by interview respondents that fall outside the other nine 
families. 
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Assessments of and Criteria for Success 
One of the last interview questions asked for the respondent’s assessment of TFI 
successfulness as well as the criteria the respondent used to make that subjective 
assessment.  The code families that resulted from this question were assessments and 
definition of success.  Table 10, below, lists the definitions of success, how many 
respondents used each one, and the number of times an assessment was associated with a 
given definition of success.  Each occurrence of an assessment code corresponds to a 
respondent’s assessment of the success of a specific TFI initiative.  Fourteen TFI 
initiatives were assessed as successful, four assessed as moderately successful, and three 
assessed as unsuccessful. There are more than twenty assessments of success because 
some respondents were involved in and made assessments of multiple TFI initiatives.  
Also, many respondents listed more than one definition of success, so each of those 
definitions was applied to each of the respondent’s assessments. 
Table 10: Assessments and Definitions of Success 
Success defined by 20 experts Assessment  
(occurrences) Successful  Moderate  Unsuccessful  
Mission accomplishment (14) 12 2 0 
Cohesiveness between units (10) 7 2 1 
Successful deployments (9) 6 2 1 
Successful inspections (6) 5 1 0 
Better trained organizations (3) 2 0 1 
Making better use of resources (3) 2 1 0 
Covering manpower gaps (2) 1 1 0 
Interoperability (2) 1 0 1 
 
The sample size and the nature of the interview question preclude making strong 
assertions, but generally speaking it appeared that mission accomplishment and inter-unit 
cohesiveness were common criteria for gauging TFI success.  Deployments and 
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inspections, a subset of the RED HORSE mission, seemed to be particularly relevant data 
points for characterizing mission accomplishment.  Interestingly, the codes better trained 
organizations, making better use of resources, and covering manpower gaps, which 
speak to synergies touted by champions of TFI were among the least common criteria for 
gauging TFI success.  In summary, it appeared that a deficiency in accomplishing the 
mission as a cohesive team may correlate with unit leaders assessing the TFI as less than 
successful.  Again, these trends were based on a small sample and an interview question 
not meant to objectively characterize the success of TFI. 
Interaction between Units 
One of the first interview questions asked the respondent to characterize the 
interaction between the two TFI units in terms of communication, collaboration, and 
perceptions.  The perceptions were coded as factors and were included in the discussion 
above, but the other two topics each became a code family.  Inter-unit communication 
was divided into four codes: event driven, routine meetings, constant interaction, and 
copied on emails.  Typically respondents listed more than type of communication.  Table 
11, below, portrays the relationship between inter-unit communication and perceived TFI 
success (assessment).  The occurrences shown in parentheses in the first column list how 
many of the twenty-one TFI initiatives with a success assessment exhibited each 
communication type. It appeared that successful TFI initiatives incorporated several 
communication methods and frequencies.  The bottom two communication methods 
represent intentional communication that is not solely spurred by an upcoming event or 
regularly scheduled meeting and were only exhibited by successful TFI initiatives. 
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Table 11: Communication and Perceived TFI Success 
Communication Code Assessment 
(occurrences) Successful Moderate Unsuccessful 
Event driven (16) 12 3 1 
Routine meetings (15) 9 4 2 
Constant interaction (6) 6 0 0 
Copied on emails (2) 2 0 0 
 
The second dynamic of interaction between TFI units is their collaboration.  Table 
12, below displays the relationship between collaboration and perceived TFI success 
(assessment).  The occurrences shown in parentheses in the first column list how many of 
the twenty-one TFI initiatives with a success assessment exhibited each collaboration 
type.  Respondents often listed more than one type of collaboration, but it appeared that 
successful TFIs incorporated several collaboration types.  Also notable is that 
unsuccessful TFIs had no collaboration on inspections/exercises or deployments, both 
commonly used as definitions of success as discussed above.  Moderate TFIs also had 
few occurrences in those two areas. 
Table 12: Collaboration and Perceived TFI Success 
Collaboration Type Assessment 
(occurrences) Successful Moderate Unsuccessful 
Troop Training Projects (14) 12 1 1 
AFSC training (13) 10 2 1 
Inspections/exercises (10) 10 0 0 
Homestation training (7) 5 2 0 
Extracurricular (6) 5 1 0 
Deployments (5) 4 1 0 
 
Themes from Respondent Observations 
Throughout each interview there were instances where a respondent would make 
an interesting remark that did not directly answer the question at hand, but in several 
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instances these observations—as they were coded—would be repeated by multiple 
respondents.  The following is brief summary of the observations made by at least three 
of the twenty respondents.  Similarities in the number of respondents making an 
observation do not imply that the same respondents made each observation. 
The first recurring theme was that the respondent thought their TFI initiative was 
the best in RED HORSE.  Such observations came from members of all four TFIs.  Of 
the seven respondents claiming to have the best TFI there was a four to three split 
between ARC and AD, and a four to three split between enlisted and officers.  Claiming 
one’s TFI initiative is the best in RED HORSE is subjective, and in all but one case the 
claim coincided with the member assessing their TFI initiative as successful.  The one 
outlier assessed his TFI initiative as moderately successful and asserted that TFI across 
the RED HORSE enterprise is moderately successful. 
The next recurring theme was that the respondent’s TFI initiative had made 
positive progress since the respondent arrived at the squadron.  Five of the twenty 
respondents made mention of positive progress.  This observation was particularly 
prevalent among respondents who were present when the TFI was initiated.  The passing 
of time allows opportunities for unit members to become familiar with each other.  Also, 
it takes time to establish and fine-tune processes. 
Another recurring theme was that the success of a TFI is dependent on 
personalities, especially those of squadron leadership.  Five respondents emphasized 
personalities as a critical factor in effectively leveraging TFI.  This observation differed 
somewhat from the attitude subfamily in that those quotations coded as factors depicted 
either a positive or negative effect from personalities, while this observation depicted 
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personalities as a teeter-totter; the TFI could swing to one side (successful and beneficial) 
or another (unsuccessful and disadvantageous) depending on the personalities involved.  
An interesting counterpoint was that junior airmen tended to immediately buy in to the 
TFI and cooperated well regardless of the personalities of leadership. 
The next recurring theme was a perceived fear that the ARC would break 
equipment during their drill weekend.  Five respondents, including both AD and ARC 
members, made this observation.  Members relayed that the AD would have to hold back 
equipment critical to upcoming TTPs or risk project delays and the headache of 
determining who was going to pay for the damage.  This observation seemed to be an 
example of parochialism because respondents based this fear on anecdotes heard from 
others rather than firsthand experience. 
Yet another recurring theme was that TFIs with geographically separated units or 
between RED HORSE and Prime BEEF units are ineffective.  This observation was made 
by five respondents.  The geographically separated units don’t realize cost savings from 
shared resources and communicated and collaborated infrequently.  The active associate 
TFI initiatives between RED HORSE and Prime BEEF units have potential to realize cost 
savings from shared resources, but the units do not have a common mission, which 
minimizes the incentive to collaborate. 
The last recurring theme from respondent observations was that the objectives and 
measures of effectiveness (MoEs) set forth in integration plans are not appropriate for 
RED HORSE TFI initiatives.  Respondents relayed that these MoEs exist for all units and 
are minimally impacted by having a TFI, or TFI effects are difficult to distinguish from 
other effects.  An additional observation was that these goals were more affiliated with a 
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flying mission where production—maximizing the use of an aircraft—is the primary 
impetus for TFI.  Conversely, the RED HORSE peacetime mission is training to ensure a 
wartime capability, while production—creating new facilities—is an indirect benefit.  
Therefore, the MoEs for a RED HORSE TFI should measure training in relation to cost 
to validate that TFI is adding value to the RED HORSE enterprise.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter culminates the research effort in RED HORSE TFI by providing 
conclusions and recommendations from the collected data and subsequent analysis.  The 
first section reviews the research objective and describes how the data answered the four 
investigative questions.  The second section discusses the significance of this research to 
the Air Force and to the RED HORSE community in particular.  The third section 
contains several recommendations to improve the outcomes of RED HORSE TFI.  
Finally, the last section presents future research opportunities.  
Research Objective Addressed 
The overarching objective of this research was to understand how TFI units can 
maximize the benefit from their CSAF-directed associations.  This objective spurred the 
research question, “what are the beneficial and non-beneficial outcomes of TFI initiatives 
between RED HORSE organizations from the perspective of the units themselves and the 
RED HORSE enterprise, and what actions can improve these outcomes?”  This research 
question was further subdivided into four investigative questions.  A case study 
methodology encompassing structured interviews with twenty senior RED HORSE 
members and framed by various RED HORSE and TFI-related documents revealed 
prevailing outcomes and factors as experienced by the units themselves as well as the 
RED HORSE enterprise.   Interview respondents proposed many ideas for improvement, 
which were examined in light of the outcome and factor discussions. 
The first investigative question asked “how do TFI units and the RED HORSE 
enterprise benefit from TFI?”  The data indicated that the nominal intent of TFI to 
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synergize efforts between components and more effectively use scarce resources is being 
met in the RED HORSE community.  Interview respondents frequently identified cost 
savings from sharing resources and synergies in manpower, logistics, and training.  Table 
3 illustrated that the ARC received the greatest share of the benefits, which was an 
expected finding because TFI is conceptually designed such that the associate unit 
leverages the host unit’s resources.  Benefits for the AD typically resulted from 
incorporating ARC manpower or unique capabilities garnered from civilian employment 
to enhance training and accomplish taskings (see Table 2), which gets back to 
synergizing efforts between components.  Meanwhile, the most frequently cited benefit to 
the RED HORSE enterprise was being able to capitalize on these synergized efforts by 
employing a pre-existing TFI team to meet mission requirements, rather than constructing 
an ad hoc team that must navigate teambuilding while striving to accomplish a mission. 
The second investigative question asked “what disbenefits to TFI units and the 
RED HORSE enterprise result from TFI?”  The data indicated that each TFI stakeholder 
receives disbenefits which may be trivial or quite prominent depending on the situational 
context and the attitudes of the organizations.  ARC units face leadership and 
management challenges as well as risks to their ability to execute planned training 
brought on by their dependency on resources owned by an AD force that is constantly in 
flux.  On the other hand, the AD experiences leadership and management challenges 
along with a perceived drain on their resources.  Although the leadership and 
management challenges are different for AD and ARC, 72% (31/43) of the occurrences 
of the leadership/management challenges code co-occurred with codes from the 
component characteristics code subfamily indicating that these challenges for both 
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components often stem from differing organizational climates brought about by differing 
administration and policy between components.  These differences in organizational 
climate, which are often described as cultural differences between components, can 
precipitate parochialism that results in resistance to collaboration or friction when 
collaboration does occur. 
The third and fourth questions asked “how do contextual factors contribute to 
realizing benefits and disbenefits from TFI, and how might contextual factors be 
influenced to make TFI initiatives more beneficial to the constituent units, RED HORSE 
enterprise, and the Air Force?”  Interview respondents posited a number of factors 
contributing to the outcomes they identified (see Table 6), and it is in the manipulation of 
these factors that outcomes may be improved.  The code subfamilies divide factors into 
topic areas, but another relevant distinction is whether a factor is internal or external, 
which indicates the ease with which a factor may be manipulated.  If a RED HORSE 
organization or relevant staff agency cannot directly control the factor then it is external.  
Those factors within their direct control are internal factors. The PRTC is a good example 
of an external factor because it influenced the outcomes in the Andersen TFI and it is 
outside the span of control of the 254th and 554th RHS leadership.  Consequently, leaders 
in the two units must take actions to mitigate the associated negative effects and 
maximize the associated positive effects so that the resulting outcomes are mostly 
benefits.  Conversely, the rapport between units is an internal factor that may be 
improved by more frequent interaction, teamwork, and trust building.  There may be 
interdependencies between factors that must also be addressed in developing 
manipulation or mitigation strategies.  Returning to the rapport example, teamwork may 
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require resources (e.g. for a TTP), and differing organizational culture may have a 
moderating effect on trust building.  The component characteristics discussed above, 
which are frequently linked to leadership/management challenges, are external factors, so 
it is not easy to manipulate them directly.  However, the way in which these component 
characteristics are viewed is more likely a matter of attitudes, which are more easily 
influenced because they are internal factors.  The second recommendation, found in the 
Manage Attitudes toward TFI to Improve Benefits section, provides suggestions for 
exploiting this interdependency between attitudes and component characteristics to 
improve the benefits of TFI initiatives. 
The respondent-provided improvement suggestions had a strong connection to the 
posited factors (see Table 8).  The logical connection from desired outcome to 
contributing factor to improvement suggestion, exemplified in Figure 7 below, adds to 
the credibility of these suggestions as viable options to improve TFI outcomes.  However, 
TFI stakeholders need to consider the internal or external nature of the factors involved 
before attempting to implement an improvement suggestion to ensure that the 
improvement is within their authority.  The most recurrent respondent-provided 
improvement suggestions are incorporated into the recommendations discussed later, but 
Appendix F includes the entire list of improvement suggestions with the related factors 
and outcomes for each suggestion.  Appendix F can be a tool for RED HORSE leaders to 
apply explicit suggestions from the panel of experts to address situations faced by RED 
HORSE TFI initiatives. 
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Figure 7: Outcome – Factor – Improvement Logic Chain 
Significance of Research 
This research was a systematic inquiry into the previously unstudied topic of AF 
TFI in a non-flying mission area.  Total force integration within the AF was created with 
the flying community in mind, and subsequent academic analysis of TFI has been 
exclusively within that same domain.  Many parallels exist between a flying TFI and a 
combat support TFI, but the circumstances are substantially different between the two 
communities and merit separate examination.  Studying RED HORSE directly yields 
more appropriate and specific recommendations than analogizing flying-related TFI 
research.  Further, adapting lessons from this research to other combat support functional 
areas may be more straightforward than making analogies from flying TFIs because RED 
HORSE shares more commonalities with other combat support functions.  In fact, RED 
HORSE is an ideal area for pilot research in combat support TFI because RED HORSE 
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squadrons integrate nearly every combat support function so they can be self-sustaining 
units. 
The case study methodology used in this research characterizes the contributions 
of TFI in a primarily qualitative—the outcomes and contributing factors—manner, but 
also adds a quantitative dimension—how prominent an outcome is or how many TFIs 
exhibit a collaboration type.  This research is relevant to current and future RED HORSE 
leaders because it communicates the spectrum of benefits and disbenefits TFI units 
receive as well as factors that contribute to receiving those outcomes.  Understanding the 
outcomes of TFI can assist with benchmarking and sharing best practices, communicating 
benefits that TFI brings, and increasing awareness of the disbenefits incurred from TFI.  
Examining contributing factors to TFI outcomes is the first step to being able to improve 
those outcomes.  The recommendations that follow and the improvement suggestions 
listed in Appendix F are immediate strategies that RED HORSE leaders can apply as 
appropriate to their situation.  RED HORSE TFI initiatives are expected to persist for the 
foreseeable future so improvements resulting from this research should enable the AF to 
better leverage relationships and resources within the RED HORSE community.  Further, 
the richness of the data collected during this research effort—interviews alone constituted 
over 26 hours of audio that translated to 240 pages of transcripts—provides ample 
opportunity for further research to develop additional tools to inform policy and decision 
making with regards to TFI. 
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Recommendations 
This section synthesizes factor-outcome relationships as well as respondent-
provided improvement suggestions into three recommendations.  The first 
recommendation concerns the expectations of ARC members in terms of their ancillary 
and AFSC-related training.  The second recommendation pertains to managing attitudes 
toward TFI as a means to improve outcomes.  The third recommendation considers how 
an emphasis on enterprise level engagement and planning could create more beneficial 
TFI outcomes than the current conditions.  Greater vision focus guiding TFI 
implementation in RED HORSE organizations would provide the appropriate framework 
to evaluate these three recommendations. 
When trying to improve TFI, a good starting point would be to ensure that leaders 
throughout the RED HORSE community have a clear and consistent understanding of the 
expectations regarding TFI.  Respondents used eight different criteria to measure TFI 
success revealing that they varied in their perceptions of what it meant for a TFI to be 
successful.  Further, they varied in their perception of whether TFI units were meant to be 
good neighbors that share resources, a cohesive team postured for joint employment, or 
something in between.  Clarifying expectations could come in the form of a playbook to 
communicate the vision senior leaders in the AF CE community (e.g. the CE Council) 
have for RED HORSE TFI and add specificity to the broad Air Force TFI vision 
contained in AFI 90-1001.  Perhaps the most important aspect of RED HORSE-specific 
TFI guidance would be clear objectives for RED HORSE TFI initiatives.  The 
respondents who were aware of the objectives and measures of effectiveness spelled out 
in integration plans felt that these objectives and measures were not helpful in indicating 
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TFI effectiveness.  This TFI vision and its corresponding objectives should feed into 
resource allocation to ensure that both words and actions from headquarters convey clear 
expectations to TFI units.  For example, if a primary objective of RED HORSE TFI is to 
create cohesive total force teams to meet combatant commander requirements then units 
should receive resources to facilitate inter-unit cohesion, such as MPA days for ARC 
units or funding specifically for TFI training and projects.  Naturally, efforts to improve 
inter-unit cohesion must be grounded in the AF objective for TFI of making more 
effective and efficient use of limited resources. 
Ensure Appropriate Training Expectations for the ARC 
A frequent area of discussion during interviews was whether training 
requirements for ARC members are appropriate and how that impacts their relationship 
with their AD teammate.  One requirement noted by seven respondents was that the ARC 
has to overcome a significant ancillary training burden levied upon their very limited 
training time.  Traditional ARC members serve for 39 training days (two weekends per 
month and one two-week period) per year to accomplish the same required training that 
the AD has 275 workdays (accounting for weekends, holidays, and 30 days of leave) to 
accomplish.  Often training frequencies for ARC members are reduced by half compared 
to AD, yet they are allotted only one seventh of the training time.  The ancillary burden is 
particularly poignant for TFI because when ARC members are doing ancillary training 
they are not working with their AD counterparts to build rapport and skill proficiency.  
Respondents affirmed the connection between ancillary training and missing 
opportunities to leverage TFI in that 73% (8/11) of the occurrences of the ancillary 
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burden on ARC time code co-occurred with at least one code from the missed 
opportunities subfamily. 
Knowing that ancillary requirements are outside the CE community’s span of 
control, leaders within the CE and RED HORSE communities should consider how to 
best cultivate predictably consistent capabilities across the total force.  Meeting training 
requirements for any component is governed by time constraints, resource constraints, 
and how time and resources are allocated.  It follows then that either the constraints and 
resource allocation must be adjusted to meet the requirements or the requirements must 
be adjusted to meet the constraints and resource allocation.  Starting with the 
requirements adjustment to meet the constraints and resource allocation, one alternative 
could be to narrow the scope of proficiencies expected of ARC members.  This could 
take the form of prioritizing the training requirements or removing some requirements 
outright.  An example could be allowing ARC members to specialize in a subset of the 
required craft-specific skills, particularly in career fields with extensive requirements 
such as equipment operations (3E2X1).  This arrangement could require greater 
managerial finesse in allocating members to work crews, but nine respondents relayed 
that balancing work crew composition based on member’s capabilities is already a 
common practice in multi-component projects. 
If reducing requirements for ARC members is untenable, then the constraints and 
resource allocation must be modified.  Having mechanisms in place for ARC members to 
gain and maintain AFSC skills outside drill weekends and annual tours relaxes the 
constraints by giving members more time to meet the requirements.  One such 
mechanism is to allocate mandays for traditional reservists and guardsmen to join the AD 
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unit’s training events or to come in for training events facilitated by full-time ARC 
members.  Members of an unofficial classic associate explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
TFI noted that additional training for ARC members beyond the required 39 training days 
was critical to maintaining skill proficiency and qualification, and training together 
enhanced trust between AD and ARC members (Hood, 2014; McCrackin, 2014).   
If requirements cannot be reduced and constraints cannot be relaxed, then the way 
resources are allocated must be modified.  When it comes to allocating human resources, 
requiring members to be employed in the construction industry for entry into a 
construction AFSC would mitigate degradation of perishable skills.  Having members 
that work in construction as civilians does not explicitly contribute to meeting training 
requirements unless policies are in place that account for the AFSC-relevant experience 
ARC members gain when their civilian work is in related field.  Nonetheless, having 
ARC members that bring relevant civilian expertise is regularly touted as a force 
multiplier in literature (e.g. Riche et. al, 2007; Sotallaro, 2008) and was cited as such by 
fifteen of the twenty respondents.  Further, 65% (11/17) of the occurrences of the access 
to expertise code that were tagged as a benefit to the AD co-occurred with the 
competence from working everyday in craft code.  Restricting construction AFSCs to 
members in civilian construction vocations could pose a significant challenge to 
recruiting, but even a quota to increase the percentage of members with civilian 
construction experience could substantially improve a unit’s capability.  A possible next 
step toward implementing this restriction would be further research into quantifying the 
current amount of relevant civilian employment in the ARC and establishing criteria to 
determine exactly what jobs are relevant. 
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TFI initiatives provide an ideal opportunity to cultivate ARC skill level 
progression because the additional training opportunities and expertise provided by the 
AD, but resources and positive attitudes are required to make it happen.  Opportunities to 
leverage AD classes and TTPs mostly happen on weekdays, which makes mandays and 
civilian sector support a prerequisite to capitalizing on those opportunities.  In terms of 
attitudes, some AD members may resent a requirement to train their ARC counterparts, 
but they may also be overlooking the training value found in the preparation for and act 
of teaching others.  Setting clear expectations provides decision makers and unit leaders 
with a common understanding to align resources and unit level execution. 
Manage Attitudes toward TFI to Improve Benefits 
A highly recurring theme cited by all twenty interview respondents was that 
organizational attitudes and the attitudes of unit members were prominent factors in what 
outcomes would result from TFI, as well as the magnitude of those benefits or 
disbenefits. Table 7 illustrates that attitudes are relatively important contributors to TFI 
outcomes.  More importantly, all the codes in the attitudes subfamily are internal factors, 
meaning they may be directly influenced by RED HORSE leaders.  Therefore, a two 
pronged approach at managing attitudes rooted in change management and diversity 
management is proposed.  These two fields are especially relevant to TFI because at the 
most fundamental level TFI is bringing two dissimilar (i.e. diverse) organizations 
together to create a new (i.e. changed) partnership with a common mission.  Leaders of 
TFI organizations could do well to incorporate lessons from change management and 
diversity management literature, but because of their increased span of control leaders 
above the unit level could make even greater gains by learning from these two fields. 
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The first strategy to manage attitudes is to increase buy-in, especially at the unit 
leadership level, to bring about more positive attitudes toward TFI and improve 
outcomes.  Buy-in reflects a person’s commitment to and sense of ownership in a concept 
or initiative, and eleven respondents explicitly connected sufficient buy-in with benefits 
or lack of buy-in with disbenefits.  One important aspect of obtaining buy-in is for 
members to understand the vision behind a particular concept or initiative (Argyris, 
1998), which is reinforced by clear objectives to measure how effectively an initiative is 
meeting that vision.  In the case of TFI, unit leadership needs to have a clear 
understanding of the vision behind implementing TFI in their units.  Members of the 
Andersen and Malmstrom units relayed that the vision behind their TFI initiatives was 
quite clear because the units at each location were dependent on each other to muster a 
full RED HORSE squadron equivalent.  Consequently, the leaders of those organizations 
had very positive attitudes toward TFI and attempted to maximize the benefits derived 
from their TFI initiative.  In fact, 84% (53/63) of the quotations by members of Andersen 
and Malmstrom units coded with a code from the attitudes subfamily referred to positive 
attitudes and the benefits that resulted.  In contrast, only 52% (80/154) of all the 
quotations with codes from the attitudes subfamily referred to positive attitudes.  The two 
additive TFIs are an example of an external factor, their mutual dependence, creating a 
good understanding of the vision behind their TFI which improved an internal factor, 
their buy-in, and ultimately resulting in benefits  Other stimuli could potentially generate 
a clear understanding of the TFI vision, such as the Civil Engineer’s vision proposed 
earlier, combined with an effective communication strategy for propagating that vision 
out to unit leadership, and even down to the lowest Airman.   
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An important aspect of a TFI vision for the RED HORSE community is emphasis 
on what each stakeholder stands to gain from TFI.  This research could be one of many 
references used to help communicate TFI benefits.  Seeing where one could benefit from 
an initiative develops a sense of ownership in the initiative, which is an important aspect 
of obtaining buy-in (Trader-Leigh, 2002).   Even more than seeing potential benefits, 
actual involvement in developing an initiative could create a sense of ownership, also 
referred to as internal commitment, in that initiative (Argyris, 1998).  73% (8/11) of the 
occurrences of the buy in – sufficient code came from members who had formative roles 
in the development of their TFI initiative (e.g. helped stand up the TFI initiative).  Seven 
of the eight members having formative roles also assessed that their TFI was successful.  
The eighth member expressed optimism that the TFI would be successful, but stopped 
short of making an actual assessment because he left while the TFI initiative was still in 
its early stages and too soon to justifiably assess success.  Involvement could be 
encouraged by requesting input from TFI units and then acting on that input.  For 
example, if ACC created a task force to develop a concept of operations for joint 
inspection of TFI units then the members of that task force would have a greater sense of 
ownership and, perhaps, more buy-in to TFI.  Similar initiatives could be conducted 
where the two unit commanders in a TFI initiative create a task force of members from 
both organizations to handle meaningful issues for their TFI initiative. 
The second strategy to manage attitudes in TFI associations is to establish and 
emphasize processes as a means for making outcomes less affected by attitudes.  The 
premise for this strategy is that a simple, repeatable process will produce more reliable 
results than if a process is too complex or not present at all.  Simple, repeatable processes 
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make accomplishing tasks routine rather than variable and create clear understanding of 
the roles and responsibilities of each process member (Project Management Institute, 
2013).  It follows that if fewer members are involved in a process and the role expected 
of each member is clearly understood then the outcome of the process will be less 
influenced by eccentricities of process members. 
An example synthesized from two interviews pertaining to managing vehicle use 
by the associate unit during drill weekends will illustrate this concept of processes to TFI 
RED HORSE units.  As a starting point, an associate unit needs a consistent mechanism 
for identifying their vehicle requirements to the host unit.  In one case this mechanism 
was that several senior enlisted members from the associate unit individually walked into 
the host unit’s vehicle operations shop throughout the Friday before a drill weekend, each 
with separate vehicle requests.  Consequently, these associate unit members were met 
with resistance and the associate unit’s requirements were not fully met.  This is an 
example of an insufficiently developed process that caused the outcome to be highly 
influenced by the host unit members’ attitude.  In another case, a drill training plan 
prepared at a standard duration before a drill weekend included a consolidated vehicle 
request that was submitted to an appropriate point of contact within the host unit.  This 
host unit point of contact could quickly deconflict the vehicle requirements of the two 
units so that both the vehicle operations shop and the associate unit had time to act upon 
the request in a manner that was solely based on vehicle availability and not on attitudes.  
This is an imperfect example, but it illustrates how haphazard and inconsistent processes 
create more opportunity for attitude-related disbenefits than simple, repeatable processes 
that streamline tasks.  The utility of simple, repeatable processes is equally valid, and 
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perhaps more impactful, at higher echelons due to the increased span of control those 
higher echelons possess.  
These two proposed strategies for managing attitudes may be challenging to 
implement, but each strategy complements the other to maximize their impact.  The 
implementation challenge lies in both strategies requiring consistent deliberate effort, but 
the results of both are touted by management literature (e.g. Argyris, 1998; Belout and 
Gauvreau, 2004; Project Management Institute, 2013) to be well worth the effort.  An 
example of synergy from the two strategies is that processes are easier to establish when 
process members have buy-in to the mission the processes support.  Also, an indirect 
effect of the processes is that by minimizing the influence attitudes have on inter-unit 
activities these processes reduce the chance of worsening attitudes.  
Emphasize Enterprise-level Engagement and Planning 
A third area of frequent discussion, mentioned in nine of the interviews, was the 
ad hoc nature of the RED HORSE community and how a shift toward greater enterprise 
level management could enhance TFI initiatives.  RED HORSE organizations derive 
some of their ad hoc nature from their expeditionary mindset that comes from a 
peacetime mission solely focused on wartime readiness.  In an expeditionary environment 
the nature of the work—dauntingly large tasks that must be completed very rapidly—
along with the often austere infrastructure result in organizations that place centralized 
control as a subordinate priority to decentralized execution (i.e. mission 
accomplishment).  The other contribution to the ad hoc nature of RED HORSE comes 
from the way the units are organized.  While ACC is the lead command, there are 
significant managing stakeholders at AFCEC, Headquarters AF, AFRC, the National 
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Guard Bureau, PACAF, and six state governments.  In addition to the organizational 
reporting relationships, the ad hoc character of RED HORSE organizations is manifested 
in training, manpower, and, until recently, TTP selection.  The TTP selection process is 
undergoing changes to align with efforts to centralize construction prioritization and 
selection (RED HORSE Program office, 2013a).  This process change could be an 
opportunity to better leverage TFI, as described below. 
Suggesting that RED HORSE take on an enterprise level management approach is 
not meant to convey complete standardization across the RED HORSE enterprise, but 
rather a wider visibility of opportunities and more closely aligned priorities.  One 
respondent’s particularly poignant example of managing TTPs at the enterprise level was 
“Right now red horse squadron commanders tend to choose troop training 
projects on their own.  In other words ACC puts together a list, the commanders 
look at their needs and wants, and they pick off the list, and then they go on their 
merry way and go do the work… Instead of trying to manage it at the squadron 
level, let's go more to an enterprise level of management and let the squadrons 
figure out how they're going to source projects.  You’re going to assign a lead unit 
and basically build either a task force or whatever you want to call them to do 
those projects.  Now we would be attacking the Air Force's priorities. [Staffs] 
would be running the show versus the squadron commanders running the show 
from the bottom up.  When you do it that way you actually get more benefit from 
the association piece because it's easier for those reserve and guard components to 
see the schedule and plug-in, and start taking benefit of some of the regional 
availability and other things. You cast a little bit wider net and you might be able 
to find savings on equipment based on the regionalization of the projects.” 
This enterprise view on TTPs synergizes efforts across components, but can still afford 
flexibility to unit commanders in how they execute the TTPs.  This style of TTP 
management also forces longer range planning, which provides ARC units the time 
necessary to manage schedules with civilian employers to facilitate higher ARC 
participation.  Longer range planning, particularly planning for multiple fiscal years, 
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presents more opportunity to request and advocate for MPA and RPA mandays—another 
enabler of higher ARC participation.  Planning, civilian sector support, and manday 
funding were noted by eleven respondents, five respondents, and sixteen respondents, 
respectively, as factors supporting ARC participation. 
Nine of the twenty respondents remarked that their unit had different priorities 
than those of their TFI teammate, and the respondents linked that divergence to receiving 
a disbenefit.  Therefore, aligning unit-level priorities with an enterprise-focused mindset 
could help reduce or alleviate those disbenefits.  For example, five respondents 
mentioned AD units had different training priorities than ARC units, and that difference 
resulted in missed training opportunities.  It was not completely clear why the priorities 
were so different, but perhaps these opportunities could have been leveraged if both units 
had similar training priorities based on enterprise training priorities.  One could argue that 
priorities are set at an enterprise level because the AFIs that establish what training is 
required and what training is SORTS reportable are authored in coordination with various 
enterprise stakeholders.  The above situation suggests that establishing requirements at an 
enterprise level does not always translate into consistent prioritization of those 
requirements.  Applying an enterprise mindset to unify priorities only works if an 
enterprise mindset addresses the root cause of the priority differences.  Enterprise focus 
may be a viable solution for correcting divergent priorities caused by personality clashing 
between unit leaders, but may not be appropriate when component-specific requirements 
are the root cause of the difference in priorities.  This is where future research (e.g. unit 
climate assessment recommendation discussed in the next section) to examine the 
magnitude of difference between priorities and what causes the divergence could 
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facilitate appropriate solutions to aligning priorities or mitigating disbenefits from 
priorities that cannot align. 
A potential mechanism for aligning unit priorities is creating higher echelon RED 
HORSE organizations.  Kerr (2012) proposed reorganizing the existing RED HORSE 
squadrons into RED HORSE groups to clarify deliberate planning of RED HORSE 
employment and more efficiently meet National Defense Strategy requirements.  Further, 
the first Expeditionary RED HORSE group formerly employed in the Central Command 
AOR and the 622nd Civil Engineer Group within AFRC are examples of higher echelon 
constructs that have already been tested.  Other members of the RED HORSE 
community, including four interview respondents, have proposed various forms of higher 
echelon organizations.  A common theme in the respondents’ recommendations was that 
reconfiguring into RED HORSE groups would better align unit priorities.  These RED 
HORSE group concepts differed from Kerr’s proposal and the 622nd CEG because the 
respondents’ group concepts combined AD and ARC squadrons into a single group to 
align priorities across components.  The shared destiny and supervisor-subordinate 
relationships that comes from being members of the same organization could be a 
powerful motivator to ensure priorities are established and executed in a consistent 
manner across the organization. 
The four respondents posited that multi-component RED HORSE groups could 
potentially be an effective means to align priorities, synergize manpower and resources, 
and improve visibility of training opportunities across the RED HORSE enterprise, but 
more research is necessary to evaluate what the ideal group configuration would be and 
characterize the immediate, secondary, and tertiary effects from such an arrangement.  
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Also, potential obstacles need to be identified and addressed.  A preliminary list of such 
obstacles includes navigating statutes and regulations (e.g. Title 10 and Title 32 
authorities), adjusting manning authorizations, ensuring fairness of command 
opportunities, and managing geographically separated units.  Again, a TFI vision tailored 
to the RED HORSE community could clarify expectations to include whether RED 
HORSE groups would enhance or detract from meeting the objectives of RED HORSE 
TFI initiatives. 
Opportunities for Future Research 
In addition to the research topics proposed to support the recommendations above, 
there may be other research opportunities for deeper investigation or adaptation of this 
research.  Additional research opportunities exist for leveraging the data collected in this 
research.  As mentioned in the limitations section of Chapter I, this analysis could be 
strengthened by having another researcher code the data to check for coding bias.  Also, 
examining certain aspects of the data more closely could reveal additional insights into 
maximizing TFI benefits and minimizing disbenefits.  For example, research could 
consider how the number of mandays an ARC unit executes affects TFI outcomes (e.g. 
how might results differ if Andersen was omitted).  Alternatively, one could compare 
ANG units and AFR units more closely to determine if the characteristics of each 
component are more influential or less influential than other factors that differentiate the 
ARC units.  Another common practice to advance a research area is to investigate one of 
the assumptions made in previous research.  For example, this research assumed that the 
RED HORSE concept of operations would not change; therefore, future research could 
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consider the suitability of each component, as well as TFI associations, in meeting the 
requirements of a prospective change to the concept of operations.  Establishing a 
baseline of FY2013 posturing was another assumption of this research, but fiscally-
induced changes (e.g. force structuring) and geopolitically-induced changes (e.g. 
deployment tempo) could have profound effects in TFI initiatives.  For example, Riche 
et. al (2007) concluded that deployments created common experiences that help to 
overcome negative cross-component stereotypes, so how might a reduction in 
deployments affect relationships between TFI units, and what other efforts could provide 
similar opportunities for teambuilding through common experiences? 
Another strategy for advancing a research area is to examine a similar research 
question using a different methodology.  This research included only twenty members 
whose positions give them operational and strategic level insights into TFI.  An 
alternative that could capture a larger spectrum of opinions would be to conduct climate 
assessments in each TFI unit to characterize strengths and weaknesses as seen by unit 
members.  Likert style questions designed to measure prominent outcomes, factors, and 
factor-outcome relationships could produce more quantitative results to target 
improvement strategies.  The AF survey program makes conducting such a survey 
possible only if it is initiated by someone empowered to act upon the findings (i.e. a unit 
commander).  Each commander would be provided with the results from their squadron 
to address their specific situation, but the aggregated results from all TFI units could be 
analyzed centrally to find solutions relevant across the enterprise or solutions that 
correlate well with specific situations to create a situational model.  Another option 
would be to analyze all the quantitative data associated with each RED HORSE squadron 
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to determine objective measures of TFI contribution (e.g. costs, tangible impacts to 
readiness) and determine where further data collection could produce higher fidelity 
measures.  Finally, interview respondents from this research also provided numerous 
ideas for further examination in the RED HORSE and TFI domains that can be seen in 
Appendix G. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
Introduction 
This research is intended to identify opportunities to increase the benefits that RED 
HORSE organizations derive from total force integration (TFI).  The purpose of these 
interviews is to determine the outcomes of TFI and the factors contributing to those 
outcomes. 
 
Interview Protocol 
Confidentiality:  All interview answers will remain confidential. 
 
Non-Attribution:  All comments, remarks or suggestions will not be attributed or 
assigned to a specific person or persons.  
 
Academic Freedom:  Those interviewed should feel free to express their observations, 
views, and recommendations without regard to rank or position.  At any time, you can 
stop the interview for any reason with no adverse affects. 
 
Notes 
 
Green text in all capitals is used to clarify intent of the bracketed words used in the 
questions listed below.  Bracketed words are placeholders for other text that will be 
tailored to each interviewee. 
 
Blue text is used to set apart important information that the researcher will communicate 
verbatim to the interviewee.  This information guides the flow of the interview and 
provides definitions to ensure consistent understanding among interviewees.  
Interviewees received a copy of this guide with the blue text removed. 
Questions  
BRACKETED UNIT REFERENCES BELOW WILL BE REPLACED WITH THE 
ACTUAL UNITS RELEVANT TO THE INTERVIEWEE 
 
Thank you for lending your time to support my research.  Your responses along with 
those from other interviewees will be the cornerstone of my research and will ultimately 
form the basis of my recommendations.  For this reason I ask that you be completely 
candid with your responses.  No information that you provide will be published in a 
manner that could be traced back to you, and all the data that I collect will be tightly 
safeguarded.  Do you have any questions before we begin? 
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The first group of questions is designed to collect general information about yourself and 
your experience with RED HORSE TFI.  Subsequent questions will examine outcomes 
and contributing factors more in depth through the eyes of three different stakeholders. 
 
1. What RED HORSE unit(s) are/were you involved in? 
 
2. What is/was your role in that unit(s)? 
 
3. In each of the following areas, describe to me what [your unit] being in a TFI with 
[associate unit] means in terms of the interaction between the units. 
a. Inter-unit communication (who, how, and how often) 
 
b. Collaboration (what and how often) 
 
c. Perceptions [your unit] members have of [associate unit] members 
 
d. Perceptions [associate unit] members have of [your unit] members 
 
Now we are going to discuss specific outcomes—which will be classified as either 
benefits or disbenefits—as they are experienced by various stakeholders.  These 
outcomes may fall within a variety of areas and I encourage you to consider each of the 
topic areas listed on the last page of your interview guide.  First, we will discuss the 
benefits, which I will now define. 
Benefit:  A good or helpful result or effect; advantage 
 
4. How does [your unit] benefit from being in a TFI with [associate unit]? 
 
 
5. How does [associate unit] benefit from being in a TFI with [your unit]? 
 
We will now look beyond the [your unit] and [associate unit] to consider how this TFI 
affects the entire RED HORSE enterprise, which I will now define. 
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RED HORSE enterprise:  The collective entity encompassing all RED HORSE units and 
the staff agencies supporting those units. 
 
6. How does the RED HORSE enterprise benefit from the TFI between [your unit] 
and [associate unit]? 
 
 
We will now look at the other side of the argument to consider the disbenefits to each of 
these stakeholders.  Consider the following definition. 
Disbenefit:  The opposite of benefit; a bad or unhelpful result or effect; disadvantage; 
drawback. 
 
7. What are the disbenefits to [your unit] as a result of the TFI with [associate unit]? 
 
 
8. What are the disbenefits to [associate unit] as a result of the TFI with [your unit]? 
 
 
9. What are the disbenefits to the RED HORSE enterprise as a result of the TFI 
between [your unit] and [associate unit]? 
 
 
BRACKETED BENEFITS AND DISBENEFITS BELOW WILL BE REPLACED 
BY ANSWERS GIVEN TO QUESTIONS 4-9 
Now we will revisit each of the outcomes—benefits and disbenefits—that you listed in 
the previous questions so that we may consider the factors that contributed to causing 
each outcome.  Consider the following definition. 
Factor: A circumstance, fact, or influence that contributes to a result or outcome. 
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10. Thinking about [benefit] you mentioned earlier, what are the contributing factors? 
 
 
11. Thinking about [disbenefit] you mentioned earlier, what are the contributing 
factors? 
 
The next three questions pertain to your opinions regarding your experience with TFI and 
what could be done in the future to improve RED HORSE TFI. 
12. Would you consider the TFI between [your unit] and [associate unit] successful?  
Why or why not? (What is your definition/measure of success?) 
 
 
13. How would you modify TFI so that [your unit], [associate unit], and the RED 
HORSE enterprise could receive more benefit and less disbenefit? 
 
 
14. What else should I be asking?  Are the questions I’ve been asking getting at the 
most important aspects of this issue? 
 
 
This concludes the interview.  Thank you for taking this time out of your busy schedule 
to support my research.  If you don’t mind I may contact you in the near future with a 
short follow up question depending on the responses I get to the last question (#14).  If 
you have any further questions or comments please feel free to contact me any time.  
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Topic areas to consider: outcomes 
 
Home station manpower 
Deployment augmentation 
Logistics 
Facilities 
Equipment 
Vehicles 
Materials 
Special capabilities 
Readiness and compliance inspections 
Troop training projects 
Contingency skills training 
Field training 
Vehicle and equipment training 
Operations tempo 
Personnel tempo 
Finances 
Interoperability 
Administration 
Professional development 
Morale 
Good order and discipline 
Recruitment and retention  
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Appendix B: IRB Exemption Letter 
  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
WRIGHT .PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO 
MEMORANDUM FOR LT COL TAY W. JOHANNES 
FROM: Joseph B. Skipper, 1.1 Col, Ph.D. 
AFIT lRB Research Reviewer 
2950 Hobson Way 
Wrighi-Pattenon AFB, OH 45433-7765 
06Novem~2013 
SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request from human eotperimenlation requiremenls (32 CFR 
219, DoDD 3216.2 andAFI 40-402) fur "Am!ysisofTota!Foroe IDtegntioniDRED HORSE 
"----'-" n ~•..,......uOIIS. 
I. Your request was based on the Code ofFederal Regulations, title 32, part219, sedion. IOI, 
parayaph (b) (2) Research activities thai involve the use of educational tests (cognitive, 
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), swvey prooedures, interview prooedures, or observation of 
public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identified, dixec11y or throngh identifiers liDked to the subjects; and (it) Any 
disclosure of the human subj ects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of criminal or ci>il liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation_ 
2. Your stndy qualifies for ilhis exemption because you are not collecting sensitive data, which 
could reasonably damage the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. Ftutber, 
the demographic data you are collecting cannot realistically be expected to map a given response 
to a specific subject. Your plan includes ample and appropriate measures to safeguard my 
information collected and your mitigation plan should such breech occur is adequate. 
3. This determination pertains only to the Federal, Department of Defense, and Air Force 
regulations that govern the use ofhuman subjects in research. Further, if a subject' s future 
response reasonably places them at risk of criminal or civil liability or is damaging to their 
financial standing, employability, or reputation, you are requ.iied to file an adverse event report 
with this office immediately. 
JOSEPH B. SKlPPER, Lt Col, Ph.D. 
AFIT Researc:h Re>iewer 
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Appendix C:  Consent Form 
Consent Form to participate in interviews supporting 
An Analysis of Total Force Integration in RED HORSE Organizations 
 
I am a graduate student at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), and I am 
conducting interviews for my thesis research.  I am studying the outcomes of total force 
integration (TFI) in RED HORSE organizations and the factors that contribute to those 
outcomes.  The purpose of this research is to provide recommendations for improving the 
outcomes associated with TFI. 
 
During this study, you will be asked to answer some questions about TFI outcomes and 
the factors contributing to those outcomes from the perspective of your unit, your 
associated unit, and the larger RED HORSE community.  This interview was designed to 
be approximately forty-five to sixty minutes in length; however, please feel free to 
expand on the topic or talk about related ideas.  Also, if there are any questions you 
would rather not answer or that you do not feel comfortable answering, please say so and 
we will stop the interview or move on to the next question, whichever you prefer. 
 
The interview will be audio recorded and transcribed for further analysis.  All the 
information you provide will be kept confidential.  Responses will be published only in 
an aggregated form so that no response will be traceable to an individual interviewee.  No 
personally identifying information will be kept with your responses, and I will keep all 
data in a secure place.  Only my thesis advisor, Lt Col Tay Johannes, and I will have 
access to this information.  Upon transcription the audio recording will be destroyed.  
Upon completion of the thesis, all data will be destroyed or stored in a secure location. 
  
Participant's Agreement: 
 
I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary.  I understand the intent 
and purpose of this research.  If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, 
I may do so without any penalty and without having to give an explanation.   
 
I understand that I will not be compensated financially or otherwise for my participation.  
I am aware the data will be used in a master’s thesis that will be publicly available online 
at www.dtic.mil.  The data gathered in this study are confidential with respect to my 
personal identity unless I specify otherwise. 
 
 84 
If I have any questions about this study, I am free to contact the student researcher (Capt 
Grant Bloom, grant.bloom@us.af.mil, 937-255-3636) or the faculty adviser (Lt Col Tay 
Johannes, tay.johannes@afit.edu, 937-255-5654 ext 3556).  
 
I have been offered a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own reference.  
 
I have read the above form and, with the understanding that I can withdraw at any time 
and for whatever reason, I consent to participate in the interview. 
 
 
________________________________          ___________________ 
Participant's signature                                        Date 
 
 
________________________________ 
Interviewer's signature 
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Appendix D:  Complete Code List 
Number of occurrences for each code is shown in parentheses 
Additional research 
Cost effectiveness of ARC (1) 
Effect of TFI documents (1) 
How related are AFSCs & civilian jobs (1) 
How well are we meeting intent of TFI (1) 
Implications of MAJCOM change (1) 
Leadership/direction of RED HORSE 
program (2) 
Metrics to quantify TFI contribution (1) 
Need for RED HORSE in ARC (1) 
RED HORSE TFI or Prime BEEF 
augmentation (1) 
Role of MAJCOM support to TFI (1) 
TFI implications for AD, AFRC, and 
ANG (1) 
TFI or just MOA (2) 
Understand implications of additive TFI 
with no unified control (1) 
Unit climate assessment of TFI (1) 
What to merge and what to keep    
separate (1) 
 
Assessments 
TFI moderately successful (4) 
TFI successful (14) 
TFI unsuccessful (3) 
Magnitude – insignificant (8) 
Magnitude – significant (7) 
 
Benefits 
Benefit to AD unit (55) 
Benefit to ARC unit (60) 
Benefit to enterprise (23) 
Ability to work with other units (14) 
Able to meet required number of squadron 
equivalents (2) 
Access to expertise (52) 
Access to facilities (24) 
Access to more robust logistics (9) 
Access to vehicles/equipment (34) 
Additional source of resources (9) 
Administrative help (7) 
Better trained craftsmen (11) 
Careerfield professional development (6) 
Continuity (20) 
Cost savings from shared resources (14) 
Covering manpower shortfalls (46) 
Crossflow/assistance to execute staff 
guidance (2) 
Deployment augmentation (21) 
Enhanced morale (5) 
Federal resources for state mission (4) 
Good remuneration (5) 
Inspections/exercises (10) 
Interoperability (7) 
Manpower/logistics synergy (14) 
Networking (4) 
Offering training opportunities (12) 
Opportunity to hone leadership skills (5) 
Pre-existing teams (12) 
Re-blueing effect (5) 
Recruiting AD members (7) 
Recruiting from attractive situation (4) 
Reduced Ops/Perstempo (3) 
Special Capabilities Training (25) 
Template/proof of concept (5) 
Training synergy (6) 
Troop training projects (21) 
Vague mention of overall benefits (16) 
Vehicle Maintenance (9) 
 
Collaboration 
AFSC skill training (14) 
Deployments (6) 
Homestation training (8) 
Inspections/Exercises (13) 
Outside work (6) 
Troop Training Projects (16)  
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Communication 
Constant interaction (7) 
Copied on emails (2) 
Event driven (25) 
Routine meetings (18) 
 
Disbenefits 
Disbenefit to AD unit (32) 
Disbenefit to ARC unit (27) 
Disbenefit to enterprise (15) 
AD make big decisions (1) 
Constraints to using ARC (22) 
Duplication of resources (2) 
Hassle to accommodate other unit (21) 
Inability to adapt (3) 
Inability to work taskings together (25) 
Insufficient logistics (3) 
Leadership/management challenge (43) 
Limited COCOM missions (1) 
Lost training when equipment/vehicles 
unavailable (13) 
Missed opportunity to gain benefits (14) 
Overcrowding the compound (4) 
Overstating capabilities (9) 
Perceived as less of a squadron (9) 
Reinventing the TFI wheel (7) 
Risk from interdependencies (6) 
TFI-induced burden on resources (14) 
Under-resourced because TFI  
relationship (5) 
Vague mention of overall disbenefits (10) 
 
Definition of Success 
Achieving common goals / mission 
accomplished (14) 
Better trained organizations (3) 
Cohesiveness between units (10) 
Covering manpower gaps (2) 
Interoperability (1) 
Making better use of resources (3) 
Successful deployments (9) 
Successful inspections (6) 
 
Factors 
AD budget larger than ARC (9) 
AD has old/inadequate facilities (1) 
Adaptive application of unique ARC 
member skills (18) 
Additive TFI to make composite 404 (24) 
Administrative red tape (5) 
Ancillary burden on ARC time (10) 
ARC force structure (6) 
ARC longevity/stability (17) 
ARC reliance on AD-owned assets (20) 
ARC schedule (21) 
Assumed greater space sharing (2) 
Both units weak in same area (3) 
Buy in – lacking (12) 
Buy in – sufficient (10) 
Co-location (30) 
Common goals (10) 
Comparable capability between 
components (4) 
Competence from working everyday in 
craft (19) 
Constraints from civilian employment (6) 
Cooperation – lacking (13) 
Cooperation – positive (32) 
Deployed in place (6) 
Different dwell rates (19) 
Different IT systems (4) 
Different MAJCOM than host (3) 
Different priorities (19) 
Differing organizational culture (22) 
Difficulty recruiting in local area (1) 
Disjointed C2 structure (1) 
Disparate capability between 
 components (6) 
Drawdown of deployments (1) 
Few echelons of command (2) 
Formalized agreements (3) 
Frequent AD rotation (22) 
Funding – lacking (23) 
Funding – sufficient (8) 
Good rapport (38) 
Informal agreements (4) 
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Factors (continued) 
Insufficient analysis (4) 
Insufficient cross-component staff 
interaction (1) 
Insufficient mandays (10) 
Integrated facilities (7) 
Invading my space mentality (6) 
Lack of collaboration (3) 
Lack of communication (7) 
Local connections (7) 
Logical UTC organization (1) 
Long time working together (2) 
Low remuneration for ARC CC 
positions (1) 
Many echelons of command (2) 
Negative stereotypes (8) 
New/unskilled members (15) 
Obstacle higher up chain of command (7) 
Perceived lower ARC competence (10) 
Personality differences between 
leadership (12) 
Planning – insufficient (12) 
Planning – sufficient (7) 
Political pressure to do TFI (2) 
Programming incentive to use 
associate (3) 
PRTC (19) 
RED HORSE culture (1) 
Separate compounds (1) 
Shared compound 
SORTS requirements 
Strong military network 
Support from civilian sector 
Support from functional staff 
Title 10 vs. Title 32 obstacle 
Trust - lacking 
Trust - sufficient 
Unclear/missing guidance from higher 
headquarters 
Undervaluing associate unit 
Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Working together frequently 
 
Improvements 
Additive TFI model as standard 
Address readiness reporting implications 
of additive TFI 
ARC as Special Capabilities specialists 
ARC unit works for AD 
Better ARC advocacy in big decisions 
Better packaging to better portray 
capability 
Better staff level coordination of TTPs 
Better staff level synchronizing resources 
Better understanding/familiarity across 
community 
Bring unit leaders together to develop 
expectations before initiating TFI 
Build up ARC capability so they can 
deploy 
Carve out TTP money to facilitate 
planning 
Create standard RED HORSE TFI model 
Dialog of each component's needs & way 
ahead 
Enterprise-level perspective 
Equal leadership opportunities between 
components 
Force collaboration 
Funding specifically for TFI 
Get ARC members to do CBTs outside 
drill time 
Involve ARC in deployments to maintain 
viability 
Make I-Plans/MOUs more specific 
Metrics focused on training vs. cost 
More emphasis on planning 
Only have TFI where units are collocated 
Paradigm shift -- training, not production 
mission 
Prioritizing use of equipment 
Propagating best practices 
Provide funding to cover TFI-induced 
burden 
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Improvements (continued) 
Provide mandays/funding to keep ARC 
proficiency up 
RED HORSE wing/groups 
Reduce administrative layers 
Reduce ARC recurring CBT requirements 
Require closer civilian job - AFSC link 
Solid line relationships 
Staff guidance that is more clear 
Submit joint training plan to ACC 
Sync deployments 
TFI considered when making cuts 
 
Observations 
AD enlisted stay RED HORSE too long 
ANG units are better than AFRC units 
ARC should not work for AD 
Crop of ARC CCs not as strong as AD 
Difficulties with active associate units 
Ensure RED HORSE tasked for 
appropriate mission 
Fear of breaking equipment 
Flying vs. combat support 
Focus TTPs on RED HORSE core 
competencies 
Forced marriage 
Greater focus on COCOM missions 
Gridlock at RH panel 
Hire leaders with RED HORSE 
background 
I-Plan goals aren't relevant 
Intent of TFI 
Internal struggle to get buy in 
Involved at/near birth of TFI 
Looking for document to resolve dispute 
Never been joint inspected 
Non-model TFIs not a good concept 
Not owning equipment is not an obstacle 
Positive progress 
Positive support from 622 CEG 
Reserves lack of equipment is a foul 
Reserves not good for perishable skills 
Significant support comes from the base 
Special capabilities responsibilities 
Speculation based on experience 
Success is personality dependent 
TFI just makes sense 
Think their TFI is best one 
Traditional ARC members from wide area 
Train with equipment you deploy with 
Turnover creates instability in TFI 
Uncertainty in manpower standard 
Use RED HORSE for more projects to 
keep training high 
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Appendix E: Factor Links to Outcomes 
Notes: All factors that were linked with an outcome are listed alphabetically flush with the left margin.  The 
outcomes associated with each factor are indented and are annotated as either benefits or disbenefits.   
 
AD budget larger than ARC 
 Benefit: Offering training opportunities 
 
Adaptive application of unique ARC member skills  
 Benefit: Access to expertise 
 
Additive TFI to make composite 404  
 Benefit: Covering manpower shortfalls 
 Disbenefit: Insufficient logistics 
 Disbenefit: Perceived as less of a squadron 
 
Administrative red tape  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
Ancillary burden on ARC time 
 Disbenefit: Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
 Disbenefit: Overstating capabilities 
 
ARC force structure  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
ARC longevity/stability  
 Benefit: Continuity 
 Disbenefit: Inability to adapt 
 
ARC reliance on AD-owned assets  
 Disbenefit: Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
 
ARC schedule  
 Disbenefit: Constraints to using ARC 
 Disbenefit: Hassle to accommodate other unit 
 Disbenefit: Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
 
Assumed greater space sharing  
 Disbenefit: Overcrowding the compound 
 
Both units weak in same area  
 Disbenefit: Insufficient logistics 
 
Buy in - lacking  
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Buy in - sufficient  
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
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Co-location  
 Benefit: Access to facilities 
 Benefit: Access to vehicles/equipment 
 Benefit: Cost savings from shared resources 
 Benefit: Offering training opportunities 
 Benefit: Re-blueing effect 
 Benefit: Special Capabilities Training 
 
Comparable capability between components  
 Benefit: Interoperability 
 
Competence from working everyday in craft  
 Benefit: Access to expertise 
 
Constraints from civilian employment  
 Disbenefit: Constraints to using ARC 
 
Cooperation - lacking  
 Disbenefit: Inability to work taskings together 
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Cooperation - positive  
 Benefit: Training synergy 
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Deployed in place  
 Disbenefit: Limited COCOM missions 
 Disbenefit: Overstating capabilities 
 
Different dwell rates  
 Disbenefit: Constraints to using ARC 
 Disbenefit: Inability to work taskings together 
 Disbenefit: Risk from interdependencies 
 
Different MAJCOM than host  
 Disbenefit: Overcrowding the compound 
 
Different priorities  
 Disbenefit: Inability to adapt 
 Disbenefit: Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Differing organizational culture  
 Disbenefit: Hassle to accommodate other unit 
 Disbenefit: Inability to adapt 
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
Disjointed C2 structure  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
Disparate capability between components  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 Disbenefit: Overstating capabilities 
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Few echelons of command  
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Formalized agreements  
 Benefit: Federal resources for state mission 
 
Frequent AD rotation  
 Benefit: Continuity 
 Disbenefit: Reinventing the TFI wheel 
 
Funding - lacking  
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Funding - sufficient  
 Benefit: Covering manpower shortfalls 
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Good rapport  
 Benefit: Enhanced morale 
 Benefit: Recruiting AD members 
 Benefit: Training synergy 
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Insufficient analysis  
 Disbenefit: Overstating capabilities 
 Disbenefit: Risk from interdependencies 
 
Insufficient mandays  
 Disbenefit: Constraints to using ARC 
 Disbenefit: Inability to work taskings together 
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Invading my space mentality  
 Disbenefit: TFI-induced burden on resources 
 
Local connections  
 Benefit: Access to facilities 
 Benefit: Networking 
 
Logical UTC organization  
 Benefit: Ability to work with other units 
 
Negative stereotypes  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
Obstacle higher up chain of command  
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Personality differences between leadership  
 Disbenefit: Leadership/management challenge 
 
Planning - insufficient  
 Disbenefit: Constraints to using ARC 
 Disbenefit: Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
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Planning - sufficient  
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Programming incentive to use associate  
 Benefit: Covering manpower shortfalls 
 
PRTC  
 Benefit: covering manpower shortfalls 
 Disbenefit: Limited COCOM missions 
 Benefit: good remuneration 
 
Shared compound  
 Benefit: Access to facilities 
 
SORTS requirements  
 Disbenefit: overstating capabilities 
 
Support from civilian sector  
 Benefit: enhanced morale 
 Benefit: offering training opportunities 
 Benefit: good remuneration 
 
Title 10 vs. Title 32 obstacle  
 Disbenefit: leadership/management challenge 
 
Trust - lacking  
 Disbenefit: Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
 
Trust - sufficient  
 Benefit: Administrative help 
 Benefit: Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters  
 Disbenefit: leadership/management challenge 
 
Unfamiliar with associate unit  
 Disbenefit: Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
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Appendix F: Improvement Link Hierarchy 
Notes: Improvements are intended to either amplify or mitigate factors, but an improvement may 
also require the presence of a factor.  Descriptors in parentheses describe the nature of the link 
between improvement and factor.  Factors cause outcomes that are either benefits or disbenefits, 
which are indicated by a B or D, respectively, before the code name.  Occurrences refer to the 
number of respondents who made the suggestion.   
Improvement: Additive TFI model as standard 
Occurrences:  3 
Example: “I really think as we look at that we need to look at the TFIs to economize our 
active-duty resources as well and that goes back to the model of one third - two 
thirds or some breakout of that. Having the active-duty component with whatever the 
reserve component is helps to give us that benefit.” 
Example: “The unofficial stance is we have never been able to take a 404 person red horse 
squadron and get 404 people out the door on the active-duty. The best we normally 
can do is about 280 to 300, so you need that 200 person ARC unit who can probably 
get out about 120 to actually put a 400 person red horse squadron out the door. So 
you need 600 to put 400 out the door. You can’t really say that, even though it's 
true.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Funding – Lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
Factor: (requires) Additive TFI to make composite 404 
Outcome: B – Covering manpower shortfalls 
Outcome: D – Perceived as less of a squadron 
 
Improvement: Address readiness reporting implications of additive TFI 
Occurrences:  2 
Example: “I don’t know that the war planners are considering the other units when you look at 
us getting backfilled by our TFI associate unit. That is a contributing factor to the 
disbenefit of TFI because they are not looking at that when you look at day-to-day 
operations and look at in Garrison operations the manpower numbers look good but 
when you start talking about deployments and the real world mission requirements 
now it is misrepresented.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Additive TFI to make composite 404 
Outcome: B – Covering manpower shortfalls 
Outcome: D – Perceived as less of a squadron 
Factor: (mitigates) SORTS requirements 
Outcome: D - Overstating capabilities 
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Improvement: ARC as Special Capabilities specialists 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “Special capabilities, I like the guard and reserve for that because they can train on it 
and they can maintain their skills. We PCS people so frequently in and out and we 
send them back to prime beef units to where you constantly have to train people in 
special capabilities.  Some of those are an art… so in that regards I like the guard and 
reserve because they can be specialists.  I think active-duty guys need to be more 
generalists.” 
Factor: (amplifies) ARC longevity/stability 
Outcome: B – Continuity 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Factor: (mitigates) Frequent AD rotation 
Outcome: D – Reinventing the TFI wheel 
 
Improvement: ARC unit works for AD 
Occurrences:  5 
Example: “I think sometimes the two full bird colonels kinda bumped heads and that was… 
counterproductive. If I could change something I'd rather see a Lt Col or a major… 
deputy commander ART which is civil service and then a reservist on the weekend. I 
think if the active-duty commander has a say on who he picks for that I think the 
trust [will be there]. The active-duty commander will know who the person is and I 
think they will work well together. Also when the active-duty commander deploys 
there is always a deputy there who is also the reserve commander so that there is 
continuity. The deputy commander knows what the active-duty commander’s goals 
are and what he wants to do with the squadron. I’d like to see that. I think that would 
avoid a lot of the Col to Col bumping heads type thing. The deputy civil service 
during the week he or she would be a civil service deputy to the active-duty and on 
reserve weekends he would be the commander of the reserve unit.” 
Example: “Quite honestly what I would do, and it may irk some of the units that are running 
well, but the command structure. You need to formalize the command relationships 
to where the larger of the units is truly the commander… If the command 
relationship was such that the [ARC] commander worked for or reported to the [AD] 
commander then that commander could be more directives and make sure that entire 
package would be more capable. But that didn't happen. When you have completely 
distinct chains of command not focused on the same priorities then you are going to 
have what happened in [unsuccessful TFI].” 
Factor:  (amplifies) Common goals 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Disjointed C2 Structure 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Personality differences between leadership 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge  
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Improvement: Better ARC advocacy in big decisions 
Improvement: Better ARC advocacy in big decisions 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “From the enterprise side is that the active-duty drives a lot of the big picture 
changes. They drive how we are going to be inspected. They drive how units are 
going to be deployed. They drive how special capabilities are going to be done. They 
are the driving force, and the disbenefit is because the guard is not always as fully 
included in that as we probably should be. I don't think there is as much 
communication and correspondence between the A7X at ACC and the A7X at ANG 
as there should be. I don't think there is enough crossflow between those two because 
active-duty does make the rules. We work within those rules and if we don't like 
them we find a different way to do it.” 
Factor: (mitigates) ARC reliance on AD-owned assets 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Factor: (mitigates) different priorities 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Improvement: Better packaging to better portray capability 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “We are also struggling with what does it mean, what does a red horse squadron 
mean… Really it can be anything from 75 people up to 500 or 600. It depends on 
how big the region is and how much work there is… If we can get the configuration 
control you can see where it would actually make associations stronger, because now 
you are training that organization for its portion of the RED HORSE mission. You 
can focus on that versus basically right now we're focusing on skill training.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Logical UTC organization 
Outcome: B – Ability to work with other units 
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Improvement: Better staff level coordination of TTPs 
Occurrences:  2 
Example: “Instead of trying to manage it at the squadron level, let's go more to an enterprise 
level of management and let the squadrons figure out how they're going to source 
projects. You’re going to assign a lead unit and basically build either a task force or 
whatever you want to call them to do those projects. Now we would be attacking the 
Air Force's priorities. [Staffs] would be running the show versus the squadron 
commanders running the show from the bottom up. When you do it that way you 
actually get more benefit from the Association piece because it's easier for those 
reserve and guard components to see the schedule and plug-in, and start taking 
benefit of some of the regional availability and other things. You cast a little bit 
wider net and you might be able to find savings on equipment based on the 
regionalization of the projects.” 
Factor:  (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (mitigates) Funding – lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Insufficient cross-component staff interaction 
 
Improvement: Better staff level synchronizing resources 
Occurrences:  2 
Example: “I think that if AFRC and ACC would look a little bit closer at the funding then I 
think at the headquarters level they would come together better. I think that the 
money could maybe be spent smarter, or there may be more opportunities at the 
squadron level to do more things because right now I don't think we have a lot of talk 
going between the MAJCOMs as far as the possibilities for TFI units. 
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (mitigates) Funding – lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
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Improvement: Better understanding/familiarity across community 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “we weren’t exposed to these other guys and [when we deployed together] I don't 
think that blended. When we come home with the [host unit] we don’t have that 
issue… I think if other units can have that working relationship I think it just betters 
their overall mission. It just helps out. When we used to deploy for the DFT or TTPs 
projects the guys out there don’t take us serious.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Working together frequently 
Factor: (mitigates) Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Undervaluing associate unit 
Factor: (mitigates) Differing organizational culture 
Outcome: D – Hassle to accommodate other unit 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Different priorities 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Improvement: Bring unit leaders together to develop expectations before initiating TFI 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “When the TFI is announced between the two units, invite the key leaders from both 
squadrons to a meeting area, away from the squadrons, to plan out the association 
before boots on the ground. The expectations will have been established before 
becoming on-line and the transition will be more productive and less 
counterproductive because neither squadron knows what to do.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Shared compound 
Outcome: B – Access to facilities 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
 
Improvement: Build up ARC capability so they can deploy 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “From what I understand that was part of the TFI initiative was to try to help with 
the ops tempo on active duty side by being able to have some folks who could deploy 
at the same time so we would have to deployed as many active… Until we can get to 
the point of the reserves have all their people and have all their people trained to the 
point where the reserve [command] is willing to commit them to that same time 
frame so they can deploy so many people and we can deploy so many people 
together to make up the total number.  We’re not there yet.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
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Improvement: Carve out TTP money to facilitate planning 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “unless we could definitively set aside money for red horse to do projects during set 
times without this fluctuation of CR and all these other things, then and only then 
could you really sit down with the [ARC] and say okay we are doing this TTP during 
this time and these are the skill sets that we’re training. do you have folks who can 
do this and do more joint or more collaboration in that regard… If they're looking at 
the IPL process and construction projects not just this year for FY 14 but also FY 15 
and 16 if those projects get locked in earlier then that will help collaboration down 
the road.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Cooperation – positive 
Outcome: B – Training synergy 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Improvement: Create standard RED HORSE TFI model 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “most people's mentality is you give them a picture of what you want to take place 
then they can put in their mind what needs to be there. Basically it’s setting that 
carrot out in front of them or setting goals in front of them.  This is where you need 
to be at officially.  This is what you need to be able to do in order to make this 
work…  I think the problem is if you put the model together then somebody's gonna 
have to cough up the funding to make it happen and I think that's the biggest reason 
why nobody's willing to put this model together from the upper leadership.  TFI in 
my opinion is working to a small degree of what it can do.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Formalized agreements 
Outcome: B – Federal resources for state mission (ANG only) 
Factor: (amplifies) Common goals 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
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Improvement: Dialog of each component's needs & way ahead 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “One thing I would ask is from the each component side of the house what they feel 
and how they're going to be successful now with all the constraints going on right 
now.  How are they going to be successful?” 
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Differing organizational culture 
Outcome: D – Hassle to accommodate other unit 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Different priorities 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Improvement: Enterprise-level perspective 
Occurrences:  4 
Example: “if I have an enterprise-level set of projects that had visibility and I knew where I 
was going to plug into and I could schedule people in and I could look at my training 
requirements and say ‘I'm going to send these folks to work with the 823rd on this 
project, and these are going to go over and work with the 819th on this project, and 
we are going to work with the 200th in the guard on this project, because those are the 
skills I need training on.’ And if we can match up all those schedules, now we can 
actually be giving the right airmen the right training in the right timeframe.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff  
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Different priorities 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
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Improvement: Equal leadership opportunities between components 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “When they deploy they rarely will put an reserve officer in charge for that. We try 
to push back.  We will send chiefs and send majors over there as well.  I think that 
needs to be looked at harder. That's been a reserve command complaint for several 
years.  ‘Send us your Indians, we don't want any of your Chiefs’ type of deal. That 
goes up and down depending on the requirements and the shortfalls of the mission.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Trust – lacking 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Undervaluing associate unit 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
 
Improvement: Force collaboration 
Occurrences:  3 
Example: “I would spend the money to exercise the units together… If we are banking on the 
fact that we are going to have TFI units go to war, then I would force the units to 
train together, and to work together, and to build some projects together. Right now 
we don't do that… It's painful and there's a lot of personality mashing and a lot of 
coordination required, but I would force that upon them… I think proving that we are 
or that the red horse enterprise is a TFI enterprise and practicing it reinforces that.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Insufficient analysis 
Outcome: D – Overstating capabilities 
Outcome: D – Risk from interdependencies 
Factor: (mitigates) Buy in – lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (requires) Funding – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Covering manpower shortfalls 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
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Improvement: Funding specifically for TFI 
Occurrences:  5 
Example: “The resourcing of actual TFI training activities.  So that way we are not scrambling 
and the active-duty is not scrambling to figure out how we're going to do a TFI.  
Training events bring a lot to the interaction and understanding.  The best training, 
the best thing we can do is when we go do things with the active duty.  It's not sitting 
and doing e-mails or seeing a few things at a Christmas party.  It's going and 
understanding and seeing each other’s strengths and weaknesses.” 
Factor:  (amplifies) Working together frequently 
Factor: (amplifies) Funding – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Covering manpower shortfalls 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Insufficient analysis 
Outcome: D – Overstating capabilities 
Outcome: D – Risk from interdependencies 
 
Improvement: Get ARC members to do CBTs outside drill time 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “If they could do [CBTs] at home then on the weekends they could just focus on 
their career field.  I think that would be a big advantage to them, but I don't know if 
they can dictate for you if you're not on the clock for the weekend to make you do 
homework. I got the feeling that they can do it, but a lot of them don't and you can't 
force them to do it so think that's an issue too.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Ancillary burden on ARC time 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Outcome: D – Overstating capabilities 
Factor: (mitigates) ARC schedule 
Outcome: D – Constraints to using ARC 
Outcome: D – Hassle to accommodate other unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
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Improvement: Involve ARC in deployments to maintain viability 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “From the TFI perspective I want to make sure—and this may go back to bigger 
levels—that to continue TFI we have to make sure that the [ARC] continues to be 
included in deployment activities… if we start getting to where just the active-duty is 
going and they throw a handful of [ARC] members we are going to get back into a 
scenario where we don't know what the [ARC] can do and we are not going to use 
them.  I know there are some financial and fiscal things that go with that, but if I 
could modify I would make sure the [ARC] units stay engaged on deployment 
rotations or at least have an opportunity… Fiscally it doesn't make sense because the 
active members can already fill it and they already get paid, but from the TFI 
standpoint I think that we need to keep that interaction and understanding.” 
Factor:  (amplifies) ARC longevity/stability 
Outcome: B – Continuity 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
Factor: (mitigates) Undervaluing associate unit 
Factor: (requires) Support from civilian sector 
 
Improvement: Make I-Plans/MOUs more specific 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “an I- plan should have more specific actions you might say.  It was real general and 
I think the MOU was supposed to streamline that and make it more detailed but I 
think the MOU that we were working with was right out of the I-Plan, which was 
vague.  Sometimes when we ran into issues, especially when we first got here, some 
of the resistance, and [we] didn't have recourse, and the I-plan or MOU was too 
vague to settle it.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Formalized agreements 
Outcome: B – Federal resources for state mission (ANG only) 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Personality differences between leadership 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
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Improvement: Metrics focused on training vs cost 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “you’ve got to go back and look at ‘Are we improving training for a lower cost?’ so 
when I'm looking at a SORTS, ART, DRRS type objective I'm saying ‘does the TFI 
allow me to meet this for the combined organization in a more efficient and lower 
cost?’” 
Factor: (amplifies) Common goals 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Political pressure to do TFI 
Factor: (mitigates) Funding – Lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
 
Improvement: More emphasis on planning 
Occurrences:  4 
Example: “Scheduling is the biggest issue.  It's just planning and scheduling. It's all there, just 
people don't take advantage of it because they just don't have the mechanisms in 
place… just having a better training plan for each organization and then doing a 
scheduling meeting between the training plans would be huge. It's just hard to get 
that stuff in place consistently when personalities are involved sometimes, but once 
you force them together and you make them start to work then it just becomes 
routine and it will be better.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
 
Improvement: Only have TFI where units are collocated 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I would also make them in close proximity. It makes no sense to have the TFI 
relationship with the unit that is 12,000 miles away. It only looks good on paper.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Lack of collaboration 
Factor: (requires) Co-location 
Outcome: B – Cost savings from shared resources 
Outcome: B – Re-bluing effect 
Outcome: B – Access to facilities 
Outcome: B – Access to vehicles/equipment 
Outcome: B – Special capabilities training 
Outcome: B – Offering training opportunities 
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Improvement: Paradigm shift -- training, not production mission 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “[readiness reporting] is where they are struggling with having these as TFIs, 
because when you're on the aircraft side of the house the associations increase 
production and they’re production oriented organizations.  It’s all sortie generation.  
It's all about launching more sorties with that tail.  It's really tough to do that for 
RED HORSE because we are primarily a training organization, not a production 
organization.  Even the active-duty units aren't production organizations, they’re 
training… So when you're looking at it that way the traditional TFI to increase 
production, it doesn't fit… the increased production is just a side benefit.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
 
Improvement: Prioritizing use of equipment 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “That's a tough one for us here… who has priority for that equipment?  Because I 
could get royally screwed if I have a project coming and the [AD unit] says ‘well we 
are going to take all the graders.’  A lot of my projects don't come with O&M so I 
can't go rent one. Maybe from a bigger level [examine] how equipment works in 
some of the TFI units.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Different priorities 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
Outcome: D – Inability to adapt 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
Factor: (mitigates) ARC reliance on AD-owned assets 
Outcome: D – Lost training when equipment/vehicles unavailable 
 
Improvement: Propagating best practices 
Occurrences:  2 
Example: “I think I would like to have a better understanding of how the flying community 
makes it a success if it is a success in the area and how we can incorporate that into 
us… I think that's an education that we need to benchmark a little bit better what we 
have.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Cooperation – positive 
Outcome: B – Training synergy 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (amplifies) Strong military network 
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Improvement: Provide funding to cover TFI-induced burden 
Occurrences:  2 
Example: “there is active-duty money that is being used to support the [ARC] and active duty 
manpower that isn't necessarily identified in a certain EEIC or accounting code. They 
don't earn manpower or even identify manpower for those TFIs, which I think would 
make it more palatable for the leadership to support them if they knew that X dollars 
and Y manpower was identified for support of the TFI… Even if we carved it out of 
their existing manpower and budget and just moved it around and recolored it I think 
it would be a lot more palatable. Even if it was no extra money but it was just 
earmarked differently there would be a positive mental effect.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (amplifies) Funding – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Covering manpower shortfalls 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Insufficient cross-component staff interaction 
 
Improvement: Provide mandays/funding to keep ARC proficiency up 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I was talking to a friend of mine who's an Army guard helicopter pilot, and he has 
to fly like once a week to maintain his proficiency. You don't have a guy out there 
digging a ditch once a week to maintain his proficiency. That's a silly example there 
but it goes towards that trust… Maybe we need to strengthen the TFI that way to 
build that trust… You spend a little money, which is not as much as full-time, to 
provide that more frequent contact and maintain proficiency and build your trust… 
maybe we need to do that and build that trust to overcome the cultural inertia.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Comparable capability between components 
Outcome: B - Interoperability 
Factor: (mitigates) New/unskilled members 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
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Improvement: RED HORSE wing/groups 
Occurrences:  4 
Example: “One of the other initiatives that we were really trying to push hard was establishing 
red horse groups where the different TFI units and units from all of the components 
reported to… One of the ideas that was thrown out is to have four distinct red horse 
groups established in CONUS geographically. So you would have a Northwest unit 
led by the 819th, a Southwest unit led by the 820th, a Southeast unit led by the 823rd, 
and a Northeast unit that is led by either the 200th or the 201st. One of the guard units. 
Have that established and have all the reporting go through those groups. That's one 
way, then you could really synergize the priorities… right now all you have is a 
bunch of units out there setting their own priorities… So you establish command 
relationships that go from the single point whether that be the ACC civil engineer or 
whoever down to subordinate units who then are responsible for the training and 
equipping and organizing of the squadrons.  You will have a much better result in my 
opinion…There is a unit out at Beale that just stood up. there's no reason it should be 
staying out on its own. It should be reporting to higher headquarters. 
Factor: (amplifies) Common goals 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Personality differences between leadership 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Disjointed C2 structure 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
 
Improvement: Reduce administrative layers 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I would try to shorten the gap if I could improve the whole red horse concept.  For 
instance the mission tasking was a lot of red tape and a lot of approvals.  If I could 
shorten the gap between that and show the willingness that these guys have, that they 
wanted to do it.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Few echelons of command 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Administrative red tape 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
Factor: (mitigates) Obstacle higher up chain of command 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
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Improvement: Reduce ARC recurring CBT requirements 
Occurrences:  4 
Example: “The world of CBT's is hell. It's based on an active-duty environment because 
active-duty members can sit at the computer everyday if they want and do CBT's. 
My members have two days per month… when do we get to do our AFS training?” 
Example: “CBT's and training needs could be moved to just-in-time training. A lot of that is 
already done that way. We should get off of this every year doing things and that 
would take stress off of the training to have time to do other things… That's been put 
in place for a lot of things for Prime BEEF, but for RED HORSE it hasn't. So that's a 
killer to things.” 
Factor: (mitigates) ARC schedule 
Outcome: D – Constraints to using ARC 
Outcome: D – Hassle to accommodate other unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Ancillary burden on ARC time 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Outcome: D – Overstating capabilities 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
 
Improvement: Require closer civilian job - AFSC link 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “we need to tighten down the tie between the day-to-day job and the ARC job, that 
they are more alike. Before we give someone an equipment AFSC they've got to be a 
certified equipment operator in the civilian world. That would probably kill us in 
retention but I think if we had it where they're coming off the construction site and 
say ‘we built three new lanes on I- 25 last month. You’ve got to lay some pavement 
here today, let me help you.’  You have instantaneous trust. 
Factor: (amplifies) Comparable capability between components 
Outcome: B - Interoperability 
Factor: (amplifies) Competence from working everyday in craft 
Outcome: B – Access to expertise 
Factor: (mitigates) Perceived lower ARC competence 
 
  
 108 
Improvement: Solid line relationships 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “If politically we have to keep the unit in a location then we need to relook at the TFI 
to pair up active-duty red horse with reserve component red horse even as a 
detachment or some sort of solid line to one of our enduring active red horse units so 
that we can leverage the resources of an entire active-duty red horse squadron even if 
they're not co-located to get that synergistic benefit from our reserve components. 
The example would be to draw a solid line from Hurlburt field to Charleston and put 
the detachment of active duty red horse engineers at Charleston or something similar 
to that to get that effect.  That's just an example. Rather than tying them to Prime 
Beef in another MAJCOM for a less effective euphemism for a made up TFI.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Co-location 
Outcome: B – Cost savings from shared resources 
Outcome: B – Re-bluing effect 
Outcome: B – Access to facilities 
Outcome: B – Access to vehicles/equipment 
Outcome: B – Special capabilities training 
Outcome: B – Offering training opportunities 
 
Improvement: Staff guidance that is more clear 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I think the AFRC and active-duty have to come up with an understanding… You 
have all these brilliant people who put this together and I know it sounds great and 
everything but down at the working level where do you want us to be on this thing? 
The guidance is always going back and forth and we are always trying to figure it 
out. Do they want to fully integrate the reserve and active-duty or not and you get 
both answers… I think if they let the active-duty and reserve commanders take a 
look at it and figure out how to implement it and send it back up to AFRC or ACC 
using our input I think it would it work out better. Instead of just telling us what to 
do and not getting any input.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
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Improvement: Submit joint training plan to ACC 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I would work with ACC and make recommendations on how we want to integrate 
and how we want to do our training out here. What I would do is work with the 
[associate unit] side of the house and see what would be the best feasible type of 
work where I can get my guys integrated with their guys to get the training done. 
When it comes to weekend stuff we can get by and I can adjust schedules but for the 
full TTPs side that's gonna be a little bit more work because they have to put the 
guys on orders and I have to put my guys on orders also to mirror up with them at 
whatever site they go to. If we lean forward ahead of time and put the full plan 
together working with ACC to let them know this is how plan on doing business to 
do the TFI and get it built up even stronger.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Working together frequently 
Factor: (amplifies) Buy in – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Common goals 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Support from functional staff 
Factor: (mitigates) Unclear/missing guidance from higher headquarters 
Outcome: D – Leadership/management challenge 
 
Improvement: Sync deployments 
Occurrences:  3 
Example: “if we go back to how it was where you take your sister unit with you I think it 
would be a lot better personally. You can still recover. It just takes a little more time 
once you get downrange to see what people’s skill sets are and get the right team 
composite… if we are going to have the sister units next to us that we work together 
on a daily basis as much as we can and the weekend warrior type deal, we get 
together and then we roll out together downrange.” 
Factor: (amplifies) Planning – sufficient 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Cooperation – positive 
Outcome: B – Training synergy 
Outcome: B – Vague mention of overall benefits 
Factor: (amplifies) Working together frequently 
Factor: (mitigates) Unfamiliar with associate unit 
Outcome: D – Missed opportunity to gain benefits 
Factor: (mitigates) Different dwell rates 
Outcome: D – Constraints to using ARC 
Outcome: D – Inability to work taskings together 
Outcome: D – Risk from interdependencies 
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Improvement: TFI considered when making cuts 
Occurrences:  1 
Example: “I think as we look at the coming years and the budget and the transformation that 
we’re gonna go through I think it's important that we look at TFI and co-located units 
and the benefits that they bring as a factor in what units we keep and which units we 
divest ourselves of.” 
Factor: (mitigates) Political pressure to do TFI 
Factor: (mitigates) Funding – lacking 
Outcome: D – Vague mention of overall disbenefits 
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Appendix G: Areas for Future Examination 
Note: for each entry below there is a title that summarizes the area for future examination 
followed by the quotation from the respondent where they proposed the idea.  Quotes 
were modified to ensure a clear meaning and avoid identifying the respondent.  Not all of 
the suggestions would qualify as viable thesis-level research. 
 
Implications of reassigning PACAF squadrons to ACC 
“How are we going to be impacted by being in ACC?  I know I just alluded to it but none 
of us really know the way ahead, and that’s not overly difficult, but there are a lot of 
mitigating circumstances as with any big transformational change… I really don't know 
specifically down to what questions unless your research has some prevailing stuff that 
you want to get out to the field, but that's definitely one that I think needs to be looked 
into.  For example, for an ORI ACC has a checklist but PACAF is still going to do their 
own thing. Ultimately we need to figure out who is going to execute this upcoming ORI 
out in PACAF and try to do those discussions or negotiations of what we are going to 
have to do. We pretty much did what we would do deployed so maybe they can stick to 
that. I don't know if ACC has certain special interest items that PACAF would take into 
account, but bottom line PACAF calls the shots which may or may not be red horse 
centric.” 
 
Role of TFI documents in TFI success 
“[If] you pulled all the memorandums of agreement and looked at the differences 
between them.  Of the ones that do exist you could look and see what’s successful and 
what's not successful to see if there's anything in those that procedurally set up one way 
or the other that makes it successful versus not successful.” 
 
Implications of additive TFI with no unified control 
“The other interesting part about that where it comes to TFI is if the 554th is doctrinally 
organized to marry up a guard, a reserve, and an active-duty unit and to go forward and 
deploy, how do we test that capability?  How do [we] prove that [we are] ready to go do 
that mission? … you either have to bring everybody together and exercise and get 
inspected together or you accept risk. [Do] you say the 254th is going to have an 
inspection by the guard bureau, the 307th is going to have their inspection, the 554th will 
be inspected by active-duty PACAF, and we're going to assume that the sum adds up to 
the whole and you're good to go? How can [one commander] in good faith say that our 
TFI unit is ready to go to war if [they] have no control over the other two units and their 
readiness programs. Should they report… their readiness stature [as a blended] report of 
all three units to give an overall [capability]?  How do I keep the other units from pencil 
whipping?  How can I trust them and how can they trust me that we’re getting all this 
done? … That can create a complication that I don't think we've thought through. [W]hen 
you have an associate unit that you don't directly own and control, how do you ensure 
that the unit as a whole is able to meet their wartime commitment? that's a risk of the 
TFI.” 
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Leadership/direction of RED HORSE program 
“Who has got the best vision for what the red horse program should be? The active-duty 
guys who are more reactive and responsive to today's trends, or is it the guard and reserve 
guys who know from long history that this is what the red horse program has been built 
upon and you cannot lose sight of what we truly deliver.  OEF and OIF was temporary. 
We built a bunch of B-huts and we built a bunch of K-spans and we built a bunch of 
PEB's.  That was trendy for the last 10 years, but can we really build airbases? Can we do 
heavy-duty concrete structures?  What are the core competencies?  Can we drill a well? 
That's where the guard and reserve might say ‘we haven't done this in 10 years, but it's 
really important.’ It's still important and we need to keep it a priority.  I don't know who 
is right on this.” 
“One of the things I would ask is where do you think the horse units will go in the 
future.” 
TFI or just MOAs to best leverage collocated units 
“You can say that's a leadership challenge and that's what you need to do. If it's that much 
of a leadership challenge I would raise the question is it worth the benefit of what we get 
by having the TFI, or are we better off saying if they've got capability let them bring it 
and stay within their own leadership chain? We will bring our capability and bring it 
within our leadership chain. You can still MOA and MOU material and share equipment 
[but maybe] you don't need these formal arrangements where the units are forced to come 
together and work side-by-side.” 
 
“Again it's the capacity. We need 11 [RED HORSE force modules.  We cannot afford 11 
so we have four [AD] and seven [ARC].  Those numbers have been recently cut.  Again 
my question is - and I'm not sure I'm convinced –‘do we need to have associations to 
provide that capacity or can we just provide that capacity?’ So we talked on benefits of 
integration and how it does work and who has the benefit. Is that worth the cost of the 
cultural inertia that you have to overcome to achieve it?” 
 
Cost effectiveness of ARC in protracted conflict with rotational force employment 
“The cost thing is [whether] you saving as much as you think you are with the 
nonavailability?  Are you breaking even or making money in the long run?  What I mean 
by that is if your ARC component costs you one third of what the active does yet they are 
only available 1/5 of the time so you need five [ARC] units to provide what you would 
for one active duty unit, well then are you really saving money.  On the individual level, 
yes one third for one unit, but to meet the total requirement you need more to maintain 
that same dwell…I think there is still a little bit of Cold War thinking that we are going to 
mobilize to go together and we have a very effective unit that you only had to spend one 
third on to give you guys there, but in trying to maintain combat capability on a 
protracted environment/engagement that requires rotational forces I think your cost 
benefit starts to erode, which leads to the question ‘is it worth it?’” 
Civilian job relation to military AFSC and supervisory role 
“Another interesting study that's probably outside yours is we talked about the anecdotal 
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data of how many electricians in the civilian world are electricians in the ARC, and how 
many equipment operators and carpenters or even just skilled craftsmen. It would be 
interesting to know what percentage we have out there in RED HORSE in particular. 
How many vehicle mechanics are actual vehicle mechanics in the real world?  I think that 
would help a lot with the trust factor that we talked about… I'd even take a design 
engineer that comes out on the weekend and runs a bulldozer. In the officer corps you 
probably do have people that work in engineering firms. The few officers that are new in 
the ARC were either full-time guys there or were engineers with engineering firms so 
there was a certain amount of technical expertise to be able to do city master planning 
and come in to do a beddown layout or master plan of the expeditionary site. Or people 
who oversee large projects and they come in and work a construction project for RED 
HORSE.  I just don't have a good sense of at the trade skills level how much that 
translates.  The few that I know who were either unemployed or stay-at-home people and 
they drove a tractor on their dad's farm and then they came in and operated equipment for 
the Air Force.  Is that close enough or not? 
 
I have a guy who did masonry wall construction retaining walls.  We don't typically do 
masonry working constructing retaining walls in the Air Force but when we had to do 
that and he had done it previously and was on the job site as worksite supervisor he knew 
how to operate a worksite.  Whereas if the guy is an air-conditioning mechanic or repair 
man for a company working pretty much on his own doing jobs day-to-day and has to 
lead a crew of people in RED HORSE to run a project.  Yes he can go out there and fix 
that air-conditioner but can he direct six other people how to do it? It's a little different 
skill… Leadership at the NCO and senior NCO level starts to erode a little bit as the 
leadership skills of directing crews just aren't as prevalent on the outside.  Part of that is 
because the outside companies aren't structured the way we are or leadership positions at 
the companies are people who aren't going off and doing reserve duty. We would 
probably need that kind of data and how much of a disconnect is there before we could 
even pursue the tying weekly certification or monthly certification checks of individuals 
to say that they are proficient in their skills like we talked earlier.  How connected or 
disconnected are we from trades/crafts skills in a RED HORSE squadron?” 
 
How integrated should TFI units be 
“We talked on what is merged. That might be something… as a TFI there are certain 
things that are merged together and certain things that are not.  Maybe you might be 
interested in asking some of the other units what do they merge and what do they not.  It's 
not like everybody does everything together. We are separate but we are together and it 
needs to be that way.” 
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